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Yet another strand of sexual harassment is infecting women's
lives and has begun to be treated in our courts: sexual harassment
in the home.2 In increasing numbers, women are being forced to
endure demands for sex from those who provide their housing, and
J.D., University of Minnesota, expected 2001. B.A. summa cum laude,
Augsburg College, 1997. This Article was inspired by the work of the Housing
Discrimination Law Project, a division of the Legal Aid Society of Minneapolis and
its brilliant staff attorneys Jay Wilkinson, Amber Hawkins, Kevin Ruether and
Chris Gerard. Many thanks to the Journal staff for their assistance and support.
My everlasting gratitude to Kathryn Swanson for her compassionate guidance; to
Catherine Nicholl for her graceful wisdom and to John Mitchell for his poetic
insurgency. Lastly, my utmost respect and honor to Catharine MacKinnon for
breaking the ground and inspiring us to follow, and, in her words, "to all my sisters
who fight back-each in her own way."
1. School Note, THE BLACK UNICORN 55 (1978).
2. Sexual harassment in the home, or residential sexual harassment, is
characterized by:
a misuse of authority by an individual in a trusted position of power and
his exploitation of certain opportunities, both made possible by
thestructure of the landlord-tenant metarelationship. It is within that
relationship that the landlord abuses his position of power in an effort to
ensure sexual compliance.
Michelle Adams, Knowing Your Place: Theorizing Sexual Harassment at Home, 40
ARIz. L. REV. 17, 46 (1998). As defined by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), sexual harassment consists of "[u]nwelcome sexual advances,
requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature"
when such conduct is made a condition of employment or a factor in decisions
affecting employment, or when it unreasonably interferes with work performance
or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment. 29 C.F.R. §
1604.11(a) (1999). See generally CATHARINE MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF
WORKING WOMEN (1979) (providing the bedrock legal analysis of sexual
harassment as a systematic and socially pervasive form of discrimination based on
sex).
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to live in environments charged with manifestations of sexism.3
Public consciousness has recognized the plight of sexual
harassment in the workplace, 4 and, more recently, in schools;5
however, harassment in the home has been considerably
overlooked.6 For many women, the place that is cherished as one
of solace and safekeeping has become a painful reminder of how
our identity as women has been manipulated into being the target
of sex-based discrimination regardless of context. As yet the
courts have been slow to recognize the essential distinctions
between residential and employment sexual harassment, instead
treating them as indistinguishable. This Note asserts that the
current doctrinal analysis of residential sexual harassment,
imported from employment sexual harassment, fails to address
core issues particular to the context of the home.
The courts' routine transposition of standards and paradigms
created in the context of the workplace onto fact situations
fundamentally unique to the home has resulted in a gross misfit of
legal standards. What is most frequently and gravely overlooked
by the courts in addressing the sexual harassment of women in
their homes is the nature of the harassing conduct itself as
inextricable from the context of the home. Acts of harassment in
this intimate setting are per se severe. Nonetheless, the current
legal framework dictates that such conduct is not actionable
unless and until it satisfies a level of severity prescribed in
response to harassment in the workplace.7 Furthermore, the legal
doctrine of sexual harassment was designed and has evolved to
accommodate the issues that arise from sexual harassment in the
3. According to the United States Department of Housing and Urban
Development (KUD), since the Fair Housing Act was amended in 1988, HUD has
processed 3,838 reported incidents of discrimination based on sex, and other HUD-
funded state or local civil rights agencies have handled 4,703 additional complaints.
See HUD, Housing Discrimination (visited Jan. 12, 2000) <http://www.hud.gov/
women/hsdscrmn.html>.
4. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (discussing
how Title VII is intended to eradicate the entire spectrum of sex-based disparate
treatment in employment).
5. See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Ed., 526 U.S. 629 (1999) (holding
that student-on-student harassment is actionable where plaintiff can prove school
officials acted with deliberate indifference and conduct was sufficiently severe,
pervasive, and objectively offensive).
6. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 2, at 29-30 (stating that "It]he lack of attention
to sexual harassment at home... can also be linked to the failure to appreciate the
importance of housing and the role the home plays in shaping our material
realities. ... Housing has been the neglected child of the civil rights movement,
notwithstanding its absolute centrality to our lives").
7. See infra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 18:351
2000] SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON THE SECOND SHIFT 353
workplace, issues that do not fully or fairly translate to the
residence.
In no way is this argument intended to minimize the effects
of sexual harassment in the workplace, or to stratify sexual
harassment and rank its severity. Indeed, sexual harassment in
the workplace and that in the home are inherently inter-related.
As sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination aimed at
perpetuating women's subordination, harassing conduct at work
impedes women's ability to fully participate in the marketplace,
thereby keeping them in a position of financial vulnerability.
8
This economic hardship forces women to seek housing in an
increasingly competitive and often coercive rental market, and
renders them especially susceptible to exploitation due to their
lack of both resources and options. 9 In other words, discrimination
in the form of sexual harassment stunts women's ability to earn
enough money to afford alternatives to rental housing in a
sexually hostile environment, such as buying their own homes or
moving out when the harassment occurs.' 0 Thus, the nexus
between these two contexts is clear when examined from the
perspective of the impact of sexual harassment on women's lives.
It is equally clear that sexual harassment, as a form of sex
discrimination, should be condemned in all of its pervasive forms
and contexts.
This Note argues that the current practice of transporting
Title VII standards used in analyzing employment sexual
harassment into Title VIII cases of residential sexual harassment
fails to appreciate the fundamental conceptual and circumstantial
distinctions between the two contexts. Section I gives an overview
of relevant sex discrimination laws and analyses used by courts in
both employment and housing settings." Section II sets forth a
number of specific factors substantiating the need for a
particularized standard in the housing context. Part A of Section
II addresses how the context of the home distinguishes residential
sexual harassment from that in the workplace. 12 Part B discusses
how the intersection of sex, race, and class renders the class of
victims predominantly impacted by residential sexual harassment
8. See generally MACKINNON, supra note 2 (explaining the dynamics of sexual
harassment as a means of economic and social oppression).
9. See infra notes 103-113 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 103-113 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 17-87 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 88-102 and accompanying text.
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especially vulnerable to discrimination while simultaneously
limiting their alternatives to such subjection.13 Part C examines
how the essentially criminal conduct belying residential sexual
harassment warrants effective legal condemnation of residential
sexual harassment as an offense not only against individual
victims, but also against women as a class.14 Part D discusses the
small number of cases to have specifically addressed the need for
distinct treatment of sexual harassment in the home as opposed to
the workplace, which demonstrates receptivity in some courts of
this Note's argument for particular treatment of sexual
harassment in housing. 15 Lastly, Part E explains how recent
developments in sexual harassment jurisprudence have failed to
address issues particular to residential sexual harassment, yet
may have a detrimental effect on their resolution through the
application of standards that do not fairly translate from Title VII
to Title VIII cases. 16 This Note concludes with the assertion that
the application of employment standards to sexual harassment in
the home fails to distinguish between the two types of
discrimination and their distinct consequences, and thus precludes
adequate remedies to victims of this intimately invasive and often
violent offense against the civil rights of women.
I. Background
A. Title VII
The legal doctrine of sexual harassment originated in the
employment context with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.17 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits
employment discrimination on the basis of a number of protected
classes, including sex.'5 Sexual harassment is a form of sex
discrimination. 19 Not unlike the practice of refusing to hire or
13. See infra notes 103-113 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 114-141 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 142-145 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 146-190 and accompanying text.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1999) (stating that it is unlawful for an employer
"to discriminate against any individual with respect to his [or her] compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's...
sex.").
18. See id.
19. Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) ("Without question,
when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's
sex, that supervisor 'discriminate[s]' on the basis of sex."); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11
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promote women because of their sex, sexual harassment has been
described as "an extension of occupational sexual discrimination,
in that it furthers the goal of subordinating women."20 Thus, the
harassment of women in the workplace, because of their sex,
violates Title VII's anti-discrimination mandate.
Traditionally, sexual harassment has been described as being
one of two types, either quid pro quo21 or hostile environment. 22
Generally, the distinction between these two types lies in whether
or not the harassing conduct conditions a material economic
benefit on compliance with a sexual demand.28 However, the
Supreme Court has ruled that sexually harassing conduct that
creates a hostile or abusive environment is actionable, even where
no economic term is affected. 24 The Court based this conclusion on
(1999) ('Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of [Title VII]."); MACKINNON,
supra note 2 (providing the bedrock legal analysis of sexual harassment as a
systematic and socially pervasive form of discrimination based on sex).
20. Adams, supra note 2, at 22 (explaining further that "[s]exual harassment at
work can be understood as an effort to curtail women's invasion of the male public
space, the space of commerce, government, and industry--the male domains of
power in a capitalist regime.").
21. Quid pro quo sexual harassment, as defined in the EEOC guidelines,
consists of:
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment
when (1) submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or
implicitly a term or condition of an individual's employment, or (2)
submission to or rejection of such conduct by an individual is used as the
basis for employment decisions affecting such individual ....
29 C.F.R. 1604.11(a) (1997).
22. "Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal
or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when... (3)
such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment." Id. The EEOC guidelines suggest a number of factors to
consider in determining whether there is a hostile environment:
(1) whether the conduct was verbal or physical, or both; (2) how
frequently it was repeated; (3) whether the conduct was hostile and
patently offensive; (4) whether the alleged harasser was a co-worker or
supervisor; (5) whether others joined in perpetrating the harassment;
and (6) whether the harassment was directed at more than one
individual.
EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, SEXUAL HARASSMENT: EEOC POLICY GUIDANCE 3231
(March 19, 1990).
23. See infra note 168 (discussing the distinction between the terms); see also
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751 (1998) ("Cases based on threats
which are carried out are referred to often as quid pro quo cases, as distinct from
bothersome attentions or sexual remarks that are sufficiently severe or pervasive
to create a hostile work environment.").
24. See Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 65 (holding that both quid pro quo




the provision of Title VII that prohibits discrimination in the
"terms, conditions or privileges of employment,"2 5 recognizing that
this clause "is an expansive concept which sweeps within its
protective ambit the practice of creating a working environment
heavily charged with ... discrimination."26
B. Title VIII
Residential sexual harassment is directly prohibited by Title
VIII, the federal anti-discrimination statute that bans
discrimination in housing, parallel to Title VII's protection against
discrimination in the workplace. 27 Title VIII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1968, or the Fair Housing Act (FHA), was enacted in 1968
"to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing
throughout the United States."28 Congress substantially amended
the FHA by passing the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988.29
The amendments revise a number of the procedural requirements
and remedies of the FHA to make Title VIII more effectively serve
its original purpose.3 0 Sections 3604 and 3617 of the FHA serve as
25. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (1999) (stating that Title VII makes it "an
unlawful employment practice for an employer... to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his [or her] compensations, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual's... sex").
26. Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 66 (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d
234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971). The Supreme Court cited a number of lower court
decisions recognizing that while quid pro quo sexual harassment involves benefits
of an economic nature, hostile environment sexual harassment leads to non-
economic injuries that are equally protected against. Id. at 66. "One can readily
envision working environments so heavily polluted with discrimination as to
destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability of minority group
workers.". Id. (citation omitted). "Surely, a requirement that a man or woman run
a gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work and
make a living can be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial
epithets." Id. at 67 (quoting Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (1lth Cir. 1982)).
27. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (1999). The FHA did not include sex among its
protected classes until it was amended in 1974. See Fair Housing Act, Pub. L. No.
93-383, 88 Stat. 729 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3605-3606 (1999));
see also 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (1999) (stating that Title VIII prohibits discrimination
'in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental... or in the provision of
services or facilities in connection therewith" based on sex).
28. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1999) (stating the Aces declaration of policy).
29. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (1999) (incorporating the 1988 Amendments into the
original Act).
30. See William Litt et al., Recent Developments: Sexual Harassment Hits
Home, 2 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 227, 243-44 (1992). For example, the 1988
Amendments extended the statute of limitations from 180 days to two years after
the last incident of harassment, and eliminated the $1,000 cap on awards of
punitive damages. See id. The 1988 Act also gave both HUD and the United
States Attorney General a more active role in pursuing claims on behalf of victims
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the foundation for tenants' claims of sexual harassment in
housing.31 Section 3604 prohibits "discrimination in the sale or
rental of housing" by making it illegal "to refuse to sell or rent" or
"to discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or
privileges of sale or rental... or in the provision of services or
facilities in connection therewith" based on race, color, religion,
sex, familial status, or national origin.32 Section 3617 likewise
makes it unlawful "to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere
with any person in the exercise or enjoyment of... any right
granted or protected by [this Act]."3 3 The scope of the FHA is
intentionally far-reaching, and it has been held that "the FHA
should be given a 'generous construction' to effectuate its 'broad
and inclusive' language."3 4
It is striking how few residential sexual harassment claims
under the FHA have been decided in the federal courts.3 5 While
of discrimination in housing. See United States v. Presidio Invs., Ltd., 4 F.3d 805,
807 (9th Cir. 1993) (explaining the impact of the 1988 Amendments on pending
residential sexual harassment claim, and stating, "[n]o longer was the government
limited to filing a traditional 'pattern or practice' lawsuit."). For a practical guide
to raising a claim of residential sexual harassment using either the administrative
remedy or a civil action in federal court, see NOW LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION
FUND, INC., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN HOUSING: A PRIMER (1996).
31. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604, 3617 (1999) (providing terms under which
discrimination is actionable).
32. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1999) (prohibiting discrimination in the sale or rental of
property, or terms and conditions thereof).
33. 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (1999) (prohibiting retaliation for exercise of fair housing
rights).
34. Woods v. Foster, 884 F. Supp. 1169, 1173 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (quoting
Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 616 F.2d 1006,
1011 (7th Cir. 1980)); see also Huntington Branch NAACP v. Town of Huntington,
844 F.2d 926, 935 (2nd Cir. 1984) (recognizing that Title VII and Title VIII are
"part of a coordinated scheme of federal civil rights laws enacted to end
discrimination.").
35. See Krueger v. Cuomo, 115 F.3d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 1997) (affirming HUD
Secretary's decision that landlord's sexual harassment of tenant violated the FHA);
DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1009 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that landlord's
proposition to exchange sex for rent, together with his physical touching of tenant,
was not sufficiently severe or pervasive to constitute an actionable hostile housing
environment); Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1088 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding that the
FHA's prohibition against sex discrimination includes sexual harassment); United
States v. Presidio Investments, Ltd., 4 F.3d 805, 809-10 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding
that the 1988 Amendments to the FHA applied retroactively to pending case, and
consequently reversing lower court's grant of summary judgment to defendant);
Shellhammer v. Lewallen, 770 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1985) (upholding magistrate's
finding that by analogy to Title VII both hostile environment and quid pro quo
sexual harassment are viable legal claims under the FHA, however, plaintiffs
succeeded in proving only quid pro quo claim, not hostile environment); Cavalieri-
Conway v. L. Butterman and Assocs., 992 F. Supp. 995, 1008 (N.D. Ill. 1998)
(stating that the elements of a Title VIII housing discrimination claim are parallel
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the courts have transposed the same doctrinal analysis developed
in the employment context to the few residential cases they have
ruled on, the number of sexual harassment in housing cases in no
way parallels the rate of sexual harassment in employment claims
being brought in federal courts.36 The remarkably small number
of cases does not reflect the rate of incidence of sexual harassment
against tenants, but rather how rarely such incidents are
reported.3 7 A host of factors contribute to this dearth, including
to a Title VII employment discrimination claim, but holding that plaintiff proved
neither her quid pro quo nor her hostile environment claim of residential sexual
harassment); Reeves v. Carrollsburg Condominium Unit Owners Ass'n, No. 96-
2495 (RMU), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21762, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 18, 1997)
(recognizing a cause of action for sexual harassment under the FHA, and denying
summary judgment on liability of condominium association); Williams v. Poretsky
Management, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 490, 496 (D. Md. 1996) (holding, as a case of first
impression, that sexual harassment is actionable under the FHA); Woods v. Foster,
884 F. Supp. 1169, 1173 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (mem.) (holding that homeless shelter is
dwelling within the purview of the FHA, and thus sexual harassment by shelter
authorities was a violation thereof); Beliveau v. Caras, 873 F. Supp. 1393,
1397(C.D. Cal. 1995) (holding that sexual harassment in unquestionably a form of
discrimination and thus harassment of tenant by resident manager violates the
FHA); Doe v. Maywood Hous. Auth., No. 93-C2865, 1993 WL 243384, at * 1 (N.D.
Ill. July 1, 1993) (mem.) (recognizing a cause of action for sexual harassment in
violation of the FHA); Bethisou v. Ridgeland Apartments, No. 88-C5256, 1989 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 11986, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 28, 1989) (mem.) (denying motion for
indemnification of defendanes business partner against judgment stemming from
acts of sexual harassment by defendant apartment manager, where both
defendants had been held liable by trial court); New York ex rel. Abrams v. Merlino,
694 F. Supp. 1101, 1104 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding, as a case of first impression, that
sexual harassment constitutes sex discrimination as prohibited by the FHA, even
where no loss of housing is claimed); Grieger v. Sheets, 689 F. Supp. 835, 840 (N.D.
Ill. 1988) (holding that sexual harassment is actionable under the FHA); see also
Ohana v. 180 Prospect Place Realty Corp., 996 F. Supp. 238, 240 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)
(upholding claims of discrimination based on race and national origin, but
dismissing sex discrimination claim without discussion because the plaintiffs did
not offer specific factual allegations to support their claim); Burgess v. United
States, No. C96-0205, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6015 (N.D. Cal. April 28, 1997)
(dismissing plaintiffs claim of sexual harassment for lack of proof that the conduct
complained of was of a sexual nature, or, if it was, that it was sufficiently severe or
pervasive; this is the sole case in which the plaintiff is a male alleging sexual
harassment by a female). All the cases cited herein recognize that sexual
harassment is an actionable form of discrimination prohibited by the FHA, and
include some discussion of the applicability of Title VII sexual harassment doctrine
to cases dealing with sexual harassment in housing under Title VIII. See also
David J. Stephenson, Jr., J.D., Annotation, Actions Under Fair Housing Act Based
on Sexual Harassment or Creation of Hostile Environment, 144 A.LR. FED. 595
(1999).
36. See, e.g., DiCenso, 96 F.3d at 1008 (noting that "[c]laims of hostile
environment sex discrimination in the housing context have been far less frequent
[than in the employment context].").
37. See Regina Cahan, Home is No Haven: An Analysis of Sexual Harassment
in Housing, 1987 Wisc. L. REV. 1061 (1987). In this ground.breaking article,
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fear of retaliatory eviction and reluctance to report unless the
victims feel safe and protected from further harassment.3 These
factors are exacerbated by the distinct intersection of sex, race,
and class, each of which has been targeted by its own breed of
discrimination, and therefore together compound to render low-
income minority women particularly susceptible to discriminatory
practices.3 9 In sum, the handful of cases brought under the FHA
in federal courts is an exceptional under-representation of the
magnitude of sexual harassment in housing.
In the context of housing, "'[q]uid pro quo' harassment occurs
when housing benefits are explicitly or implicitly conditioned on
sexual favors."40 Likewise, a hostile housing environment is
actionable "when the offensive behavior unreasonably interferes
with use and enjoyment of the premises," so long as the
harassment is "'sufficiently severe or pervasive' to alter the
conditions of the housing arrangement."41 Thus, the elementary
foundation of the doctrine of sexual harassment has been
transposed from the workplace to the home, with minimal changes
Cahan stated that 65 percent of the fair housing agencies that responded to her
nationwide survey reported receiving complaints of sexual harassment by owners
and landlords, for a total of 288 claims of sexual harassment in housing. See id. at
1066. Cahan stated that, "Taking into account the various reasons women are
reluctant to report their harassment, it is likely the actual incidents of sexual
harassment in housing number more than the 288 reported." Id. Cahan cited the
results of a survey of sexual harassment in the workplace that reported that only
two to three percent of victims use formal institutional remedies to report their
harassment. See id. She then analogized these results to the housing
environment, deducing that if the nearly 300 reported incidents are in fact only a
comparable fraction of overall instances, between 6,818 and 15,000 cases of
residential sexual harassment may have actually occurred. See id. at 1069-70. A
later article on sexual harassment in housing suggests that even these figures are
grossly under-representative of the frequency of such harassment. See Litt et al.,
supra note 30, at 231-44.
38. See Cahan, supra note 37.
39. See infra notes 103-113 and accompanying text.
40. Honce, 1 F.3d at 1089 (quoting Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406,
1414 (10th Cir. 1987)).
41. Id. at 1090 (citing Hicks, 833 F.2d. at 1413). The elements of a prima facie
case of hostile environment sexual harassment in housing are that:
(1) the conduct was unwelcome; (2) it was based on the sex or other
protected characteristic of the plaintiff; (3) it was sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the plaintiff's living conditions and to create an abusive
environment; and (4) the defendant knew or should have known of the
harassment, and took no effectual action to correct the situation.
Reeves v. Carrollsburg Condominium Unit Owners Ass'n, No. 96-2495 (RMU), 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21762, at *23 (D.D.C. Dec. 18, 1997) (quoting Williams v.
Poretsky Management, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 490, 496 n.2 (D. Md. 1996)).
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in terminology to reflect the different contexts. 42
C. Courts'Analyses of Discrimination Claims
Under either Title VII or Title VIII a plaintiff may establish a
case of intentional discrimination48 using one of two distinct
evidentiary routes, either by providing direct evidence of
discrimination, or by establishing indirect evidence from which
discriminatory intent is inferred and may be rebutted.44 The
indirect method of proving discriminatory intent employs a
burden-shifting analysis known as the McDonnell Douglas test.45
This burden-shifting framework requires a plaintiff to satisfy a
number of elements to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination. 46 Once a plaintiff proves her prima facie case, the
burden then shifts to the defendant to offer legitimate, non-
discriminatory reasons for its decision. 47 After the defendant
presents rebuttal evidence, the plaintiff has the opportunity to
show that the defendant's articulated reason is a pretext for
discrimination. 48 The elements of the prima facie case are
modified to accommodate the general facts of each case, allowing
the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting technique the flexibility to
apply to any claim of discrimination for which the plaintiff lacks
42. See supra notes 21-26 (discussing categories of quid pro quo and hostile
environment under Title VII cases).
43. Intentional discrimination is commonly referred to as "disparate
treatment." See, e.g., Kormoczy, v. Secretary of United States Dep't of Hous. &
Urban Dev., 53 F.3d 821, 824 (7th Cir. 1995) (explaining in general the distinction
between the direct and indirect methods of proving intentional discrimination);
Honce, 1 F.3d at 1088-89 ("The ultimate question in a disparate treatment case is
whether the defendant intentionally discriminated against plaintiff"). Conduct
may also be actionable if it is proven that certain acts or policies have the effect of
disproportionately burdening members of a protected class; this latter category is
termed "disparate impact." See, e.g., Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S.
977, 994-99 & n.3 (1988) (plurality opinion) (discussing disparate impact analysis
under Title VII); Williams v. The 5300 Columbia Pike Corp., 891 F. Supp. 1169,
1178 (D.E. Va. 1995) (analyzing the allegation that a condominium conversion had
a disparate impact on racial minority and disabled tenants).
44. See, e.g., Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977) (stating
that where a plaintiff produces direct evidence of discrimination, the indirect
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting approach is inapplicable).
45. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800-06 (1973)
(explaining the inferential burden-shifting test for discrimination).
46. See id. at 802; see also Honce, 1 F.3d at 1089 C'In the context of employment
discrimination, a prima facie case requires proof that the employer, after rejecting
plaintiffs application, continued to seek applicants with qualifications similar to
plaintiffs.")
47. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
48. See id. at 804-05.
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direct evidence.49
Courts routinely apply doctrinal standards developed in Title
VII employment discrimination cases to housing discrimination
cases governed by Title VIII.50 Thus, the general legal framework
used to establish a claim of employment discrimination has been
imported in substantially identical form to the arena of housing
discrimination.
D. Courts'Analyses of Sexual Harassment Claims
The courts have treated sexual harassment as a distinct and
discrete subset of discrimination with its own specific doctrinal
analysis, rather than applying the general framework used to
assess other claims of discrimination. 51 According to standards
used to evaluate intentional discrimination, sexually harassing
conduct constitutes direct evidence of discriminatory intent
according to the theory of disparate treatment.52 However, courts
instead employ a unique categorical examination aimed at
49. The McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is altered by courts to
accommodate the pertinent protected class-e.g., sex, race, disability, etc.-and/or
the type of discrimination, either a denial of the vacant position or apartment, or a
change in the terms and conditions thereof. See id. at 802 n.13 (noting that the
facts will vary in Title VII cases and the specification of prima facie proof required
is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations); see also
Reeves v. Carrollsburg Condominium Unit Owners Ass'n, No. 96-2495 (RMI), 1997
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21762, at *23 n.10 (D.D.C. Dec. 18, 1997) ("[The elements of a
prima facie case should be adapted to fit the circumstances."). In a case of housing
discrimination based on sex, this theory would therefore require a plaintiff to show
either that the landlord refused to rent to her but did rent to a similarly or less-
qualified male, or that the plaintiffs tenancy is subject to terms and conditions not
imposed on male tenants. See, e.g., Braunstein v. Dwelling Managers, Inc., 476 F.
Supp. 1323, 1324 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (finding no sex discrimination in policy of
federally subsidized housing complex that restricted single parent with child of
same sex to one-bedroom apartment but gave single parent with child of opposite
sex a two-bedroom apartment, holding that it was the composition of the family
unit, and not sex, that determined allocation).
50. See, e.g., Kormoczy v. Secretary of United States Dep't of Hous. & Urban
Dev., 53 F.3d 821, 832-24 (7th Cir. 1995) (applying employment discrimination
standards to familial status discrimination in housing prohibited by the FHA);
Gamble v. City of Escondido, 104 F.3d 300, 304 (9th Cir. 1997) (applying
employment discrimination framework to disability discrimination in housing
governed by the FHA, stating explicitly, "We apply Title VII discrimination
analysis in examining Fair Housing Act (FHA') discrimination claims.").
51. See, e.g., Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-69 (1986) (setting
forth analysis for sexual harassment).
52. See, e.g., Kormoczy, 53 F.3d at 824 (explaining in general the distinction
between the direct and indirect methods of proving intentional discrimination);
Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1088-89 (10th Cir. 1993) (applying theory of disparate
treatment to residential sexual harassment claim).
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determining the nature and impact of the conduct.53  The
particularized doctrine of sexual harassment has evolved in the
context of Title VII employment cases, then been imported into the
housing environment. 54 Residential sexual harassment cases have
consistently been addressed using the legal framework established
in the employment context. 55
While claims of discrimination are analyzed using the well-
founded McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting technique, and claims
of sexual harassment are assessed according to equally established
framework that has been honed and circumscribed through case
law, there is an apparent incomprehension among the courts
regarding the interplay between the two doctrines.56 Because
sexual harassment is a form of discrimination based on sex, at
first glance it would seem fitting that analysis of the harassment
would be a subset of a claim of discrimination. 57 The courts that
have reviewed residential sexual harassment cases, however, have
decided otherwise. Some have found that the harassing conduct
constitutes direct evidence of discrimination and therefore the
burden-shifting technique for inferentially proving intentional
discrimination is inapplicable.58  Other courts have subjected
53. See, e.g., Harris v. Forklift Sys, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (clarifying the
applicable standard for assessing hostile environment sexual harassment as
including both objective and subjective considerations).
54. See Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 63-69 (discussing evolution of sexual
harassment jurisprudence).
55. See, e.g., Williams v. Poretsky Management, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 490, 495 (D.
Md. 1996) (citations omitted), which states:
The courts generally rely upon three grounds in finding that sexual
harassment claims are actionable under the Fair Housing Act. First,
sexual harassment is actionable under Title VII in the employment
context. Because Title VII and Title VIII share the same purpose-to
end bias and prejudice---sexual harassment should be actionable under
Title VIII .... Second, other courts have so held .... Third, the
Supreme Court has held that sexual harassment is a form of sex
discrimination.
Id.
56. See Miranda Oshige, What's Sex Got To Do with It?, 47 STAN. L. REv. 565,
570-72 (1995) (explaining how current sexual harassment doctrine unjustifiably
distinguishes between discrimination based on sexual conduct and discrimination
based on non-sexual conduct).
57. See id.
58. See Reeves v. Carrollsburg Condominium Unit Owners Ass'n, No. 96-2495
(RMU) 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21762, at *16-17 (D.D.C. Dec. 18, 1997). In response
to the defendant's contention that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim of sex
discrimination under the FHA, the court explained:
The burden-shifting framework in McDonnell Douglas and its progeny is
commonly used to establish discriminatory intent when direct evidence is
unavailable in disparate treatment discrimination cases. However, the
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claims of sexual harassment to the preliminary requisite of the
McDonnell Douglas test, requiring plaintiffs to establish a prima
facie case of discrimination.59 Still others have subverted the
cognition of harassment within the greater context of
discrimination by effectively removing sexual harassment cases
from the discrimination paradigm and treating them separately
and in isolation.60 In addition to the erratic assessment of sexual
harassment as a form of discrimination based on sex, the courts
rarely articulate their approach, thereby compounding the
discrepancy as to the relationship between sexual harassment and
discrimination.61 In sum, there is substantial confusion as to
which doctrinal approach a court will take when analyzing a case
of sexual harassment, and the reasons therefor.
E. Recent Changes in the Doctrine of Sexual Harassment
In 1998 the Supreme Court issued decisions in two
employment sexual harassment cases, Burlington Industries, Inc.
defendant Association's reliance on this line of cases is misplaced because
the present case involves direct evidence of discrimination, namely...
direct and unequivocal racist and sexist statements and writings.
Therefore, the plaintiffs contend that the appropriate standard should be
a hostile environment test ... The court agrees.
Id.
59. See Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085 (10th Cir. 1993). The structure of the
court's opinion illustrates its conceptualization of the issues: under the general
heading "The Fair Housing Act," the court subdivided its analysis into sections
entitled "Disparate Treatment," "Sexual Harassment," and "Hostile Housing
Environment," treating each as conceptually distinct. Id. at 1088-90. The court
ultimately held that because the defendant landlord's conduct "was neither sexual
nor directed solely at women, it is not actionable under the hostile housing
environment theory." Id. at 1090. One of the three judges of the panel vigorously
dissented, authoring an opinion longer than that of the majority. See id. at 1091-98
(Seymour J., dissenting) ("The majority proceeds under an inaccurate view of the
applicable law. Although it articulates the proper test, it appears to evaluate the
sexual harassment evidence under a crabbed definition that has been specifically
rejected by this court."). Id. at 1091.
60. See DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1007-08 (7th Cir. 1996) (explicitly
refusing to grant any deference to the EEOC Guidelines that define sexual
harassment as a form of sex discrimination, then analyzing the case de novo as one
based on a hostile housing environment theory).
61. In deciphering what mode of analysis a court is employing, it is important
to bear in mind that the fundamental purpose of the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting technique is to assist plaintiffs in proving discriminatory intent by raising
a presumption of discrimination. See E-mail Interview with Kevin Ruether, Staff
Attorney, Housing Discrimination Law Project, Minneapolis, Minn. (Jan. 3-4,
2000). While defendants retain the opportunity to rebut this presumption,
nonetheless the burden-shifting approach is a critical tool used to prove
discrimination in situations in which direct proof is rare or difficult to obtain. Id.
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v. Ellerth62 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,63 holding that
agency principles, 64 not the categories quid pro quo and hostile
environment, should determine employer liability for sexual
harassment. The Court stated: "The terms quid pro quo and
hostile work environment are helpful, perhaps, in making a rough
demarcation between cases in which threats are carried out and
those where they are not or are absent altogether, but beyond this
62. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
63. 524 U.S. 775 (1998). The Court decided a third sexual harassment case
that term, Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998), which
held that same-sex sexual harassment in the workplace is an actionable form of sex
discrimination under Title VII. However, the residential sexual harassment cases
that have reached the federal courts have not raised this issue, and thus it is not
pertinent here. But see Ohana v. 180 Prospect Place Realty Corp., 996 F. Supp.
238, 239 n.2 (E.D.N.Y. 1998) (stating that women plaintiffs' claim of sexual
discrimination by women defendants was not supported by specific factual
allegations; however, defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs' claims of
discrimination based on race, religion, and national origin was denied).
64. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754-65 (reemphasizing the fact that courts are to be
guided by principles of agency law when deciding issues of employer liability for
acts of harassment committed by their employees). See id. at 757. The central
principle of agency law is: "A master is subject to liability for the torts of his
servants committed while acting in the scope of their employment." Id. at 756
(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1) (1957)). This liability may
extend to both negligent and intentional torts; however, because of the limiting
clause "in the scope of their employment," it is less likely that an employer will be
held liable for an employee's intentional tortious conduct. See id. at 756-57. Only
conduct motivated "at least in part, by a purpose to serve the [employer]" may
confer liability to the employer. Id. at 756. Therefore, because "[s]exual
harassment under Title VII presupposes intentional conduct," an employer may be
liable for only harassment intended to further the employer's business. Id. at 756.
Most succinctly, the Ellerth Court stated, "The general rule is that sexual
harassment by a supervisor is not conduct within the scope of employment." Id. at
757. However, agency principles may impose liability on the employer for the acts
of its employees even where those acts are outside the scope of their employment.
See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(1)(1957)). Vicarious
liability may be imposed on the employer for intentional torts committed by an
employee when employee uses apparent authority or when the employee is aided by
the agency relationship. See id. at 759. The "aided in the agency" relation
standard seems prima facie to encompass most harassment by a supervisor, as
"[p]roximity and regular contact may afford a captive pool of potential victims." Id.
at 760. Yet if there were any intention to construe this provision according to its
plain meaning, the Court has spoken against it. See id. The Court instead imposed
a much higher burden in order to prevent the allegedly undesirable result of
holding an employer liable "not only for all supervisor harassment, but also for all
co-worker harassment, a result enforced by neither the EEOC nor any court of
appeals to have considered the issue." Id. The Court stated that, "The aided in the
agency relation standard, therefore, requires the existence of something more than
the employment relation itself." Id. What this "something more" is depends on the
harassment itself. See id. The Court here distinguished between harassment that
culminates in a tangible employment action, and conduct that may be committed
by any co-worker and hence does not involve the supervisory role of the harasser.
See id. at 760-62.
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are of limited utility."65  The former quid pro quo/hostile
environment distinction is now replaced by a new "tangible
employment action" standard articulated by the Court.66
These recent developments dictate that the central inquiry in
determining liability is whether the harassment resulted in "direct
economic harm."67 "A tangible employment action constitutes a
significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing,
failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in
benefits."68 However, despite the Court's declaration that the
former quid pro quo and hostile environment categories are of
limited utility, the phrase "hostile environment" is not rendered
obsolete by these decisions. 69  First, the Ellerth Court's
pronouncement may be limited to the assignment of liability based
on which type of harassment occurred, in which case hostile
environment claims remain unaffected by this new decision.70
Furthermore, the Court itself used the phrase "actionable hostile
65. Id. at 751.
66. Id. at 761 (describing what may be a tangible employment action).
67. Id. at 762.
68. Id. at 761.
69. The Supreme Coures concern with the terminology used to describe sexual
harassment was motivated solely by the impact of these categories on the issue of
employer liability. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 752-54. The Court stated, "The
question presented on certiorari is whether Ellerth can state a claim of quid pro
quo harassment, but the issue of real concern to the parties is whether Burlington
has vicarious liability for [a supervisor's] alleged misconduct, rather than liability
limited to its own negligence." Id. at 753. Formerly, if a claim was raised as one of
quid pro quo sexual harassment, the employer was subject to automatic liability.
See id. at 753. The Court stated, "The standard of employer responsibility turned
on which type of harassment occurred. If the plaintiff established a quid pro quo
claim, the Court of Appeals held, the employer was subject to vicarious liability."
Id. at 752-53. Only where a plaintiff raised her claim as a hostile environment one
was she required to undergo the more rigorous test of whether the harassment was
severe or pervasive. See id. at 753-54. According to the Court's opinion in Ellerth,
the assignment of vicarious liability to quid pro quo sexual harassment was
problematic because this practice "encouraged Title VII plaintiffs to state their
claims as quid pro quo claims, which in turn put expansive pressure on the
definition." Id. at 753; see also id. at 765 C'Relying on existing case law which held
out the promise of vicarious liability for all quid pro quo claims, Ellerth focused all
her attention in the Court of Appeals on proving her claim fit within that
category.") In essence, the Court mistrusted the distinction signified by the
categories quid pro quo and hostile environment to effectively determine when an
employer is liable for the harassment, and therefore supplanted them by imposition
of the new tangible action standard. See id. at 751-66 (articulating the Court's
perceived problems with the use of the quid pro quo/hostile environment distinction
as it affects employer liability and explaining the standard of liability under
tangible employment action analysis).
70. See supra note 59.
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environment" in its holding in Faragher.71 Thus the term remains
significant for its descriptive function, yet has no bearing on
consequent liability. In sum, the standard announced in Ellerth
and Faragher replaces the former category of quid pro quo with a
new analysis regarding whether any tangible action has been
taken as a result of the harassing conduct, and leaves the hostile
environment classification substantially intact.
In addition to declaring that the category of quid pro quo
sexual harassment is superceded by the new tangible action
standard, the Court articulated a distinct test for determining
whether and when an employer is liable for the sexually harassing
conduct of its supervisory employees. 72 The Court held that an
employer is vicariously liable for "an actionable hostile
environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or
successively higher) authority over the employee."73 If no tangible
employment action is found, an employer may raise an affirmative
defense to liability or damages. 74  To succeed on this new
affirmative defense, an employer must prove both that it
"exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any
sexually harassing behavior," and that "the plaintiff employee
unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm
otherwise."75 This affirmative defense is not available "when the
supervisor's harassment culminates in a tangible employment
action, such as discharge, demotion, or undesirable
reassignment."76 If a tangible employment action is proven, the
employer is automatically liable. 77
Prior to Ellerth and Faragher, the lower courts struggled to
interpret the standards set forth in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson,78 the Supreme Court's sole decision offering guidance in
determining employer liability for sexual harassment in the
71. Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998).
72. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761-65; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 802-805.




77. See generally Jonathan Hegre & Sheila Engelmeier, Dazed and Confused&
Title VII One Year After Faragher and Ellerth, BENCH & BAR, Oct. 1999, at 37
(discussing the imposition of automatic employer liability).
78. 477 U.S. 57, 64-65 (1986) (holding that both quid pro quo and hostile
environment sexual harassment are actionable as discrimination based on sex).
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workplace. 79 In light of the many and disparate methods applied,
the new test established by Ellerth and Faragher appears to offer
a clear solution to the apparent enigma of employer responsibility
for sexual harassment.8 0 Indeed, resolving the issue of employer
liability was the impetus behind both of these decisions, which
provide lengthy justifications for what was essentially an
affirmation of Meritos dictate: courts should apply principles of
agency law when deciding vicarious liability for sexual
harassment.8' Pursuant to the Supreme Court's clarification of
how to apply established agency law in light of the new tangible
action standard, the EEOC has amended its Guidelines to
accommodate the Court's rulings.82 Lower courts now have both
the decree of our highest court and the relevant federal agency as
guidance in their determinations of vicarious liability for sexual
harassment in the workplace.
Translating these recent developments to the realm of
housing, if a sexually harassed tenant wishes to pursue a claim
holding a landlord accountable for a sexual demand prior to being
evicted or suffering some other economic injury, she must raise her
claim as a hostile housing environment one.83 An actionable
hostile housing environment exists when there is no tangible
housing action taken as a result of the harassment, yet the
harassment is proven sufficiently severe or pervasive.84 The most
79. See Faragher v. Boca Raton, 524 U.S. at 775, 793-805 (analyzing the
different approaches employed by the lower courts to impose vicarious liability).
80. But see Hegre & Engelmeier, supra note 77 (arguing that lower courts
continue to struggle in deciding employer liablility, now specifically in interpreting
the Supreme Court's holdings in Ellerth and Faragher).
81. See Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69-73 (1986) (discussing
the imposition of vicarious liability and stating that general principles of agency
law should govern); Faragher, 524 U.S. at 792 C'Meritor's statement of the law is
the foundation on which we build today.").
82. See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1999). The EEOC has also issued a press release
explaining its issuance of the final rule to conform to the Court's decisions. See
EEOC, EEOC Updates Guidelines to Comply with Supreme Court Rulings on
Employer Liability for Harassment by Supervisors (last modified Oct. 29, 1999)
<http://www.eeoc.gov/pressl10-29-99.html>.
83. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754 (stating- "For any sexual harassment preceding
the employment decision to be actionable, however, the conduct must be severe or
pervasive.").
84. See id.; see also Meritor Savings Bank, 477 U.S. at 67 (citing Henson v.
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)) ("For sexual harassment to be
actionable, it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter the condition of [the
victim's] employment and create an abusive working environment."'); Honce v.
Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1090 (10th Cir. 1993) (stating that a hostile housing
environment claim is actionable "when the offensive behavior unreasonably
interferes with use and enjoyment of the premises").
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substantial change Ellerth and Faragher impose on residential
sexual harassment is the reconceptualization of sexual demands
coupled with unfulfilled threats as not quid pro quo claims, but
rather conduct that may create a hostile housing environment-if
the plaintiff is able to satisfy the requirement that such conduct is
sufficiently severe or pervasive. s5 What constitutes severe or
pervasive harassment varies by court, as each interprets the
relevant factors differently. 86 On the other hand, if the tenant is
evicted or some other tangible housing action is inflicted after she
refuses the landlord's sexual advance, the landlord will be held
automatically liable. It is as yet unknown how federal courts will
apply the tangible housing action standard derived from the
Supreme Court's opinions in Ellerth and Faragher to residential
sexual harassment, and whether these doctrinal changes will have
any substantial effect on the outcomes of Title VIII sexual
harassment cases. 87
I. Analysis
A. The Context of the Home Renders Residential Sexual
Harassment Distinct from that in the Workplace.
The expectation of both safety and privacy in one's home is
justifiably greater than that in the workplace, and thus a higher
standard of conduct is warranted. Enforcing a heightened
standard would raise the threshold for what conduct constitutes
harassment, thereby legally condemning harassing behavior that
may not be actionable when it occurs in the workplace.88 It would
also signify legal and social intolerance for sexual innuendos,
propositions, and demands in perhaps the only place in which
authority and autonomy are unquestionable entitlements. In
other words, strict enforcement of anti-discrimination laws
regarding sexual harassment in the home would provide at least
one environment in which women would be free from the
degradation of sexual objectification.
The home has always been held to deserve special protection
from intrusion, and thus a higher standard for residential sexual
85. See 477 U.S. at 67; 1 F.3d at 1090.
86. See infra notes 156-172 and accompanying text.
87. To date, no residential sexual harassment decision interpreting and
applying the standard announced in Ellerth and Faragher has been issued.
88. See, e.g., Beliveau v. Caras, 873 F. Supp. 1393, 1395-98 (C.D. Cal. 1995)
(factoring the context of the home into its analysis).
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harassment is in principle substantiated by virtually all of
American jurisprudence. 89
Under criminal law, one can shoot an intruder to defend it.
Under tort law, one has a reasonable expectation of privacy
within it. Under constitutional law, one has a right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures within it, and a right
to engage in certain activities and make certain decisions
within the home.90
Protection of the home is so embedded in the history and
traditions of our jurisprudence that the sanctity of the home has
become an established doctrine in its own right.91 While most
frequently cited in cases involving intrusion by governmental
entities,92 the sanctity of the home doctrine has been invoked in a
variety of other settings, 93 and firmly stands for the proposition
89. See Deborah Zalesne, The Intersection of Socioeconomic Class and Gender
in Hostile Housing Environment Claims Under Title VIII Who Is the Reasonable
Person?, 38 B.C. L. REV. 861, 886-88 (1997) (internal quotations and citation
omitted):
The home is a moral nexus between liberty, privacy, and freedom of
association. Accordingly, it is not uncommon for the law to provide
greater protections to the situations involving the home. Several
constitutional provisions provide special protection for the home, and the
sanctity of the home has consistently been protected by the United States
Supreme Court .... As noted by one court, the principal object to be
effectuated by granting special protection to the home is to preserve the
home to the family, even at the sacrifice of just demands, for the reason
that the preservation of the home is deemed of paramount importance.
Id. But see Adams, supra note 2, at 22 n.17 (stating that the privileged status of
the home is "a rebuttable presumption highly dependent on the social and economic
status of the home occupier").
90. Adams, supra note 2, at 22-23 (citations omitted) (arguing the importance
and the privileged character of the home).
91. See, e.g., Sheik-Abdi v. McClellan, 37 F.3d 1240, 1243 (7th Cir. 1994)
(quoting Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 178-79 (1984)) ("The Supreme Court
consistently has emphasized 'the overriding respect for the sanctity of the home
that has been embedded in our traditions since the origin of the Republic,' because
the home, more than any other location, 'provides the setting for those most
intimate activities'); see also United States v. One Ford V-8 Sedan, 7 F. Supp. 705,
707 (D.C. Mich. 1934) (discussing the origins of the doctrine of the sanctity of the
home, and stating "Courts should not fail to take cognizance of the fact that the
enemies of civilization are now attempting to occupy the castle erected by judicial
decision to protect the innocent."). Id.
92. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603 (1980) (holding that
warrantless arrests in one's home violate the Fourth Amendment, even though the
same warrantless arrest in public may be permissible, because the sanctity of the
home confers special protection).
93. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 488 (1988) (upholding ordinance
that prohibited picketing outside one's home in light of First Amendment
challenge). The Court found that the ordinance served the significant government
interest of preserving and protecting the sanctity of the home, the place in which
persons can "repair to escape from the tribulations of their daily pursuits." Id. at
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that the home, as both a conceptual entity and a physical place,
warrants the utmost judicial protection.94 As the Supreme Court
has noted, "[s]anctity of the home is no greater than sanctity of the
person."
9 5
The home is not only a moral nexus,96 uniting shared beliefs
about family and privacy, but also a social and economic one.
97
Geographic and socioeconomic placement of one's home
predetermines access to a greater opportunity structure, including
fundamental resources such as employment and education.
98
Furthermore, the incessant phenomena of segregation and other
forms of racial and class-based discrimination perpetuate and
preserve the concentration of poverty in urban ghettos, stagnating
the potential for improvement in inner-city communities. 99 The
politicization of place demonstrates the crucial role one's home
plays in defining relative socioeconomic status as inextricable from
residential location, as well as in providing or limiting access to
myriad means of social and personal development. 00 In other
words, the home is invested with the power to define not only who
a person is, but also who a person is to become.
484. The Court stated that ensuring that people could "enjoy in their homes and
dwellings a feeling of well-being, tranquility, and privacy" is a goal of the "highest
order." Id. at 477.); see also Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957, 962 (2nd Cir. 1982)
(denying summary judgment against plaintiff correctional officers forced to quarter
National Guard officers in their staff housing while the correctional officers were on
strike, invoking the sanctity of the home doctrine as derived from the Third
Amendment. "The Third Amendment was designed to assure a fundamental right
to privacy. [Although] the privacy interest arises out of the use and enjoyment of a
property... rigid notions of ownership are not prerequisites to constitutional
protections." (internal citations omitted)).
94. See, e.g., United States v. Shafii Shaibu, 920 F.2d 1423, 1426 (9th Cir. 1990)
C'Judicial concern to protect the sanctity of the home is so elevated that free and
voluntary consent cannot be found by a showing of mere acquiescence to a claim of
lawful authority.").
95. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 25 (1925) (holding that warrantless
search of an arrestee's home, several blocks away from the site of his arrest,
violated the Fourth Amendment).
96. See Zalesne, supra note 89 (arguing that the home has always been held to
deserve special protection from intrusion).
97. See Adams, supra note 2, at 26-28 & n.43 (discussing how "the home
functions as a connection to particular and highly desired communities").
98. See john a. powell, Living and Learning: Linking Housing and Education,
80 MINN. L. REV. 749 (1996) (explaining how housing plays a role in a greater
"opportunity structure").
99. See id. For a discussion by the Supreme Court of one common form of
maintaining segregation by encouraging homebuyers to purchase properties in
segregated neighborhoods, a practice known as steering, see Gladstone Realtors v.
Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 94 (1979).
100. See generally powell, supra note 98.
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More than simply a physical place, the home is an
embodiment of myriad intangible traits that are personally and
culturally revered: identity, family, refuge from the pressures of
public life, a place to relax, recoup, and rejuvenate. 101 "All told,
the home-physical space, cultural icon, vehicle for wealth
accumulation, and mode of access to desired communities-is an
American symbol of unique power."'1 2 From an appreciation of the
privileged status of the home in both our legal system and our
culture comes the deduction that an injury inflicted in this
cherished place twice offends: once in the act itself against the
injured party, and once again as a breach of our intimate
veneration for the home itself. In this way, the sexual harassment
of women in their homes violates not only their right to be free
from discrimination, but also deprives them of their most
fundamental and precious haven from abuse.
B. The Exceptional Vulnerability of the Class of Victims
Predominantly Affected by Sexual Harassment at Home
Merits Unique Treatment.
The intersection of sex, race, and class renders low-income
women and women of color, especially those with children,
particularly vulnerable to sexual harassment by housing
providers. 103  Rental housing inherently implicates issues of
economic status. 04 Logically, if one owns her own home, she is not
101. See Adams, supra note 2, at 21-26 (providing a comprehensive analysis of
the home as a "cultural signifier and idealized symbol [that] evokes powerful
associations").
102. Id. at 28.
103. See Adams, supra note 2, at 35-38, discussing how sexism, racism, and
classism work in conjunction to compound the oppression of low-income women of
color in particular:
Race and ethnicity are powerful indicators of the ability to enter freely a
particular housing market. As a general matter, the darker the skin
color of the housing seeker, the more constrained that seeker's options
will be .... But the final gloss on all of these factors is the relationship
between gender and poverty.
Id. A brief survey of the federal residential sexual harassment cases from which
the race of the plaintiff can be determined corroborates this. See, e.g., Reeves v.
Carrollsburg Condominium Unit Owners Ass'n, No. 96-2495 (RMU), U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21762, at *3 (D.D.C. Dec. 18, 1997) (plaintiff is an African American woman;
defendant harasser is a White man); Krueger v. Cuomo, 115 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir.
1997) (same); New York ex rel. Abrams v. Merlino, 694 F. Supp. 1101, 1102 (two of
the four plaintiffs are African American women, defendant harasser is a White
man).
104. "Whether it is White, Black, or Hispanic, a female-headed family with
children is less likely to own its home than any other type of family of the same
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subject to a landlord conditioning her housing on compliance with
sexual demands or acquiescence to hostility based on her sex.
However, home ownership is expensive and thus unattainable for
many low-income people. 105 Therefore, excepting situations in
which people seek rental housing due to periods of transition, the
majority of renters are low-income persons for whom home
ownership is not an available option.106
Of low-income people as a group, the overwhelming majority
are women. 10 7 Referred to as the "feminization of poverty,"'08
women as a class are growing increasingly poor.109 Furthermore,
race or ethnicity .... Women who head families with children account for a much
higher percentage of female householders who rent (38.3 percent) than of those who
own (20.2 percent)." THE AMERICAN WOMAN 1996-97: WOMEN AND WORK 314, 322-
23 (Cynthia Costello & Barbara Kivimae Krimgold eds., 1996) [hereinafter
AMERICAN WOMAN] (citing Bureau of the Census, Household and Family
Characteristic& March 1993, 1994, Table 16).
105. HUD notes the polarization between increasing homeownership rates and
the critical lack of affordable rental housing. See Department of Housing and
Urban Development, The State of Our Cities (visited Nov. 5, 1999) <http'/www.
huduser.org/publications/pollegtNew-tsoc99/part2-3.html>. Homeownership rates,
even in urban areas, exceed 50%, which is the highest they have ever been. See id.
However, homeownership rates in suburban areas are a substantially higher 70%.
See id. "While our homeownership record is improving, shortages of affordable
rental housing are worsening. An estimated 5.3 million households have worst
case housing needs--worst case needs most often being where more than half a
family's income goes to rent." Id.; see also Adams, supra note 2, at 34 n.66
(pointing out that because renters make less money than homeowners, they pay a
high proportion of their incomes to rent and thus have difficulty saving enough
money for a down payment on a home).
106. See Adams, supra note 2, at 33-34 & n.68 (stating that even discounting
those who rent due to temporary circumstances, or because they prefer the
convenience of not owning, the majority of renters rent "because home ownership is
not a realistic economic option for them. Women form a large portion of this
market for rental housing, and are 'the fastest growing segment of the homeless
and ill-housed in our nation."' (citing the NATIONAL LOW INCOME Hous. COALITION,
1997 ADVOCATE'S RESOURCE BOOK 19 (1997)).
107. See AMERICAN WOMAN, supra note 104, at 314 (citing Bureau of
Census, unpublished data from the Current Population Survey, March 1994):
Women are more likely than men to live in poverty at all ages past
childhood. By the time a woman is 65 years old, she is almost twice as
likely as her male counterpart to be living in poverty. Nearly one-third
of all black women and 29 percent of Hispanic women live below the
poverty level; about one in five men in these groups is also poor.
Id.
108. Diana Pearce, The Feminization of Poverty: Women, Work and Welfare,
URB. & SOC. CHANGE REV., Winter-Spring 1978, at 28 (discussing the economic and
social consequences of being female that result in higher rates of poverty;
frequently cited as coining the term "feminization of poverty").
109. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 2, at 37 ('Whether one wishes to label the
problem the 'feminization of poverty' or not, women clearly earn less income and
possess less wealth than men and thus are poorer as a class, and women who head
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poverty rates increase exponentially once race is factored into the
equation.110 Finally, if a woman-particularly a woman of color-
is the head of a household that includes children, she is virtually
destined to live below the poverty level."' This statistical reality
is consistently demonstrated throughout the body of case law
dealing with residential sexual harassment. 112 It is therefore
impossible to ignore the composition of those primarily affected by
sexual harassment in housing: women of color struggling to raise
their children in situations of dire poverty.113
C. Sexual Harassment in the Home is Essentially Criminal
Conduct.
To appreciate the need for applying a higher standard for
sexual harassment in housing, it is necessary to comprehend not
only those affected, but also the exact nature of the conduct
constituting harassment. The current system of addressing sexual
harassment in both employment and housing fails to appreciate
conduct that is essentially criminal in nature." 4 The degree of
households with dependent children have extremely high poverty rates.").
110. See, e.g., Zalesne, supra note 89, at 886) ("In employment discrimination
cases, the victim of sexual harassment is usually a woman, and often a minority.
When sexual harassment occurs in the housing context, however, the typical victim
is not only a minority woman, but a poor minority woman.").
111. "When a family with children is headed by a woman, the odds that it is in
poverty approach one in two; 46 percent of female-headed families with children
were poor in 1993." AMERICAN WOMAN, supra note 104, at 316.
112. For example, the plaintiffs in Krueger v. Cuomo, 115 F.3d 487 (7th Cir.
1997), Doe v. Maywood Hous. Auth., No. 93-C2865, 1993 WL 243384 (N.D. Ill. July
1, 1993) (mem.), and Grieger v. Sheets, No. 87-C6567, 1989 WL 38707 (N.D. Ill. Apr.
10, 1989) (mem.), were recipients of Section 8 housing subsidies; the plaintiff in
Honce v. Vigil, 1 F.3d 1085, 1094 (10th Cir. 1993) was in "severe financial straits";
and the plaintiffs in Woods v. Foster, 884 F. Supp. 1169 (N.D. Ill. 1995), were
homeless women staying in a shelter.
Although it is difficult to determine with absolute certainty the racial
background of the plaintiffs in the relevant cases, several salient facts
about them are known: they are women; many of these women are the
sole financial support for their families; they are renters and at least
some of them are homeless or facing homelessness.
Adams, supra note 2, at 35.
113. See Zalesne, supra note 89, at 884 ("As a result of the traditional
subordination of minority women and the current rental housing shortage, low-
income minority women are most susceptible to domination by their landlords.").
114. See, e.g., DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1009 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding
that landlord's solicitation of sex in exchange for rent from female tenant, combined
with unwanted touching, was not sufficiently egregious to be actionable as sexual
harassment); see also Carlotta Roos, DiCenso v. Cisneros: An Argument for
Recognizing the Sanctity of the Home in Housing Sexual Harassment Cases, 52 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 1131 (1998) (explaining how the DiCenso case exemplifies the court's
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criminality is exacerbated when considered in light of the
demographics of the victims of such conduct. 115 This is not to say
that the sexual harassment of a White, upper-income female
tenant is somehow less wrong; indeed, sexual harassment in all its
perverse forms is an intolerable offense against the civil rights of
women, individually and collectively. However, when
circumstances render a victim especially vulnerable to the
harassing conduct, and exploitation of this vulnerability is
inherent to commission of the act, the harassment thus
incorporates the status of the victim into an element of the offense.
In other words, the fact that victims of residential sexual
harassment are predominantly poor women of color is not
coincidental, but essential. 116
The argument in favor of a heightened standard for sexual
harassment in the home is substantiated by consideration of the
criminal nature of such conduct."l 7 Often the underlying conduct
of residential sexual harassment claims may be actionable in
criminal proceedings, as well as a civil claim under the FHA."8 A
failure to address the severity of sexual harassment in the home).
115. See supra notes 103-113 and accompanying text.
116. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 2, at 20 (stating that "women who are renters
face additional obstacles that compromise their ability to be 'free' in the home
because of who they are and what they earn") (emphasis added).
117. See Carrie Baker, Sexual Extortion: Criminalizing Quid Pro Quo Sexual
Harassment, 13 LAW & INEQ. J. 213 (Dec. 1994) (arguing that quid pro quo sexual
harassment should be treated as a crime). Baker contends that "(tihe crime of quid
pro quo sexual harassment should be called sexual extortion in order to distinguish
it from hostile environment harassment." Id. at 247. "Recently, three states have
explicitly criminalized sexual harassment, and the military has used criminal
sanctions against sexual harassment." Id. at 214. These three states are
Delaware, North Carolina, and Texas. See id. at 214 n.7. The North Carolina law,
enacted in 1989, prohibits lessors of real property or their agents from sexually
harassing lessees or prospective lessees. See id. at 245 n.214 (citation omitted).
However, Baker's article proposes criminalizing only quid pro quo harassment, and
thus fails to acknowledge the severity of claims of hostile housing environments.
118. For example, sexual harassment frequently involves conduct that
inherently implicates criminal law, particularly rape law and extortion. Liberal
construction of several provisions of the Model Penal Code would certainly
encompass harassing conduct in the housing context. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 213.1(2)(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962), reprinted in SANFORD KADISH AND
STEPHEN SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS
1127 (6th ed. 1995) (Gross Sexual Imposition); id. § 223.4 (Theft by Extortion); id. §
223.7(1) (Theft of Services, which may apply in a jurisdiction in which prostitution
has been legalized); id. § 212.5 (Criminal Coercion); id. § 213.2 (Deviant Sexual
Intercourse by Force or Imposition); id. § 213.4 (Sexual Assault). Even where the
threat is unfulfilled, criminal sanction would be applicable per the law of criminal
attempt. See id. § 5.01 (Criminal Attempt). Furthermore, much of the conduct
comprising hostile housing environment claims is illegal under relevant criminal
harassment statutes. See, e.g., id. § 250.4 (Harassment).
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multitude of literature discusses various legal theories under
which a threat of harm other than bodily injury made for the
purpose of obtaining sex constitutes a criminal act.119 Indeed, the
explicit or implicit threat of eviction and consequent likelihood of
homelessness that underlies landlords' propositions that their
female tenants substitute sexual acts for payment of rent
constitutes an outrageous injury in both material and dignitary
terms.
Especially relevant to residential sexual harassment is the
power dynamic in the relationship between the landlord and
tenant, as compounded by the context of the home. 120 Since the
landmark cases of Javins v. First Nat'l Realty Corp.121 and
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 122  courts have
recognized that landlords have substantial bargaining power over
their tenants, and thus it is necessary for courts to protect against
abuse of this power. 123 The ultimate power of the landlord over
119. See, e.g., STEPHEN SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF
INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF THE LAW (1998) (arguing that the current
American legal system fails to protect one's right to sexual autonomy). As the
exchange of sex for rent constitutes prostitution, a particularly astute analysis of
the ways in which prostitution maintains the subordination of women is found in
Bevery Balos and Mary Louise Fellows, A Matter of Prostitution." Becoming
Respectable, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1220 (1999).
120. See Zalesne, supra note 89, at 882 C'Like sexual harassment in the
workplace, sexual harassment in rental housing rests on the imbalance of power.
Landlords, almost by definition, have significant power over their tenants."); see
also Susan Etta Keller, Does the Roof Have to Cave In? The Landlord/Tenant
Power Relationship and the Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 9 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1663, 1664-73 (1988) (describing the interrelated factors that affect the
disparity in power between the landlord and tenant). The inequality of bargaining
power is arguably more profound given that the landlord-tenant relationship is
predicated on the fundamentally personal and intimate setting of the home. See
infra Part II.A. Indeed, a number of criminal acts are treated as distinct precisely
because they are committed against family or household members, recognizing how
the context and nature of the relationship between victim and perpetrator
intensifies the criminality of the act. Compare, MINN. STAT. § 609.2242 (1999)
(Domestic Assault in the Fifth Degree), with MINN. STAT. § 609.224 (1999) (Assault
in the Fifth Degree).
121. 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970)
(establishing the implied warranty of habitability).
122. 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (holding that a consumer contract was
unconscionable based on a gross disparity in bargaining power). The theory of
unconscionability has been repeatedly applied to contracts for rental housing, and
lease terms found unconscionable may be held unenforceable. See, e.g., Ramirez-
Eames v. Hover, 108 N.M. 520, 775 P.2d 722 (N.M. 1989) (analyzing residential
lease term per theory of unconscionability); In re Estate of Hoffbeck, 415 N.W.2d
447 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987) (same).
123. See Zalesne, supra note 89, at 889-901 (proposing that certain conduct by
landlords constitutes sexual harassment per se, and that there should be a
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the tenant is the mechanism of eviction, 2 4 which carries with it
not only the immediate consequence of forced relocation or
homelessness, but also the long-term damage to that tenant's
rental history which may disable her from qualifying for
replacement housing. 125
However, eviction is not the only tool of control a landlord has
over his tenants. Particular to instances of residential sexual
harassment is the omnipresent threat of future, more egregious
harm due to the fact that the landlord has unrestrained access to
the tenants' apartment. 2 6 At any time, the landlord could use his
passkey to enter the victim's apartment and further assault her. 127
The knowledge of this potentiality inevitably influences the
victim's response to the episodes of harassment, as she must fear
for her safety in her own home. 128 Thus, landlords who harass
their female tenants through sexual demands and sex-based
hostility are exploiting both their economic dominance and their
unrestrained access to their victims.
Additionally, principles of criminality justify treating sexual
heightened standard for landlords who sexually harass their tenants due to the
disparity in bargaining power).
124. For an insightful discussion of the process of eviction and its associated
costs to both landlords and tenants, see Steven Gunn, Eviction Defense for Poor
Tenants: Costly Compassion or Justice Served?, 13 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 385
(1995).
125. Landlords are increasingly employing tenant screening agencies to screen
rental applicants' rental, credit and criminal histories, a practice which has given
rise to litigation regarding the procedures these agencies follow in compiling their
reports. See, e.g., Wilson v. Rental Research Servs., Inc., 165 F.3d 642, 646-47 (8th
Cir. 1999) (holding that tenant screening companies must use reasonable
procedures to ensure the maximum accuracy of its reports, and noting that
landlords have little incentive to rent to applicants whose reports indicate prior
evictions, regardless of the underlying circumstances, particularly in light of the
lack of affordable housing and subsequent increase in demand for housing units).
126. See, e.g., Ponticas v. K.M.S. Inv., 331 N.W.2d 907, 911 (Minn. 1983)
(upholding jury verdict finding apartment management company negligent in
failing to make a reasonable investigation into the resident manager's background
before providing him with a passkey, which he used to gain access to a tenant's
home, where he raped her).
127. See id. at 909.
128. One court deciding a residential sexual harassment case has acknowledged
the impact of women's fear of violence on their perceptions of sexually harassing
conduct: "Notably, women remain disproportionately vulnerable to rape and sexual
assault, which can and often does shape women's interpretations of words or
behavior of a sexual nature, particularly if unsolicited or occurring in an
inappropriate context." Beliveau v. Caras, 873 F. Supp. 1393, 1397 (C.D. Cal.
1995); see also Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879-80 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that
because women are disproportionately the victims of sexual assault, they are
legitimately more concerned with sexual behavior and may perceive sexual
harassment as a prelude to more severe assaults).
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harassment as a crime: while civil law protects private rights,
criminal law deals with protecting the general public from
harm. 129 As sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination
specifically intended to reinforce sex roles and perpetuate the
subordination of women,130 it is thus an offense against women as
a group, and indeed against society as a whole.' 3' The harassment
of women tenants because of their actual or perceived
vulnerability as women objectifies them as fair targets for
landlords' wanton sexual advances, causes them to live in a
constant state of fear and eliminates any hope for a haven free
from offensive sex-based degradation. Sexual harassment in the
home involves conduct that is criminal not only in raw abstract
form, but also when considered against the backdrop of the power
dynamic inherent in the landlord-tenant relationship, theories of
criminality, and its impact on women as a collective social group.
A survey of the conduct constituting harassment in the cases
addressed by federal courts to date leaves no doubt that it is both
civilly wrong and dangerously criminal. The acts alleged are by no
means ambiguous or subject to debate over their unwelcomeness
or severity. To wit, the conduct reported in Reeves v. Carrollsburg
Condominium Unit Owners Ass'n132 included "a threat of lynching
and the utterances of revolting racist and sexist epithets as well as
written notes of a racist and sexist nature."3 3 The plaintiff
therein alleged that the defendant, a resident of the same
condominium that she lived in, "physically intimidated her and
threatened to rape and kill her."134 In Grieger v. Sheets,35 the
129. See Baker, supra note 117, at 226-38.
[P]rivate wrongs, or civil injuries, are an infringement or privation of the
civil rights which belong to individuals, considered merely as individuals;
public wrongs, or crimes and misdemeanors, are a breach and violation of
the public rights and duties, due to the whole community considered as a
community, in its social aggregate capacity.
Id. at 227 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAws OF
ENGLAND 1428 (1897)). Baker contends, however, that this distinction is
ambiguous, as it is the community itself that comes to a consensus as to what
behavior it will condemn as criminal. See id. at 227-28.
130. See generally MACKINNON, supra note 2 (discussing sexual harassment as a
social phenomenon). See also Baker, supra note 117, at 231 (paraphrasing
MacKinnon: "In other words, sexual harassment reinforced a social hierarchy in
which women as a group occupied a structurally inferior and distinct place").
131. See Baker, supra note 117, at 233 ("Sexual harassment deprives many
women of an equal opportunity to pursue an occupation, education, housing, and
other critical pursuits free from the sexual demands of those in power.").
132. No. 96-2495 (RMU), U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21762, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 18, 1997).
133. Id. at *3.
134. Id. at *4.
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conduct by the landlord included damage to property and threats
to shoot the victim's boyfriend."36 Woods v. Foster137 was a suit by
three homeless women who alleged that they were subjected to
repeated "sexual advances, lewd touching of their bodies, sexually
suggestive remarks and requests for sexual favors" by the
executive director and the pastor of the church that ran the shelter
where the women sought refuge."'8 In US v. Presidio Investments,
Ltd,139 the plaintiffs landlord grabbed and kissed her on a number
of occasions. 140 In one instance, "[Defendant] Sandquist grabbed
[Plaintiff] Blair and pinned her arms behind her back. While
squeezing her neck and forcing her face upwards with his left
hand, Sandquist forcibly kissed her, cutting her lip and bruising
her neck."'' It is obvious that the underlying conduct on which
existing residential sexual harassment claims are founded
warrants severe legal condemnation. Such conduct becomes all
the more outrageous and reprehensible when perceived in context:
the offenses took place in these women's homes.
D. A Number of Federal Courts Have Addressed the Need for
Distinct Treatment of Sexual Harassment in Housing
Cases.
A handful of federal court decisions have notably supported
the contention that sexual harassment in housing is conceptually
distinct and therefore deserves a particularized standard
accommodating the differences between it and harassment in the
workplace. The first of these cases to acknowledge the discrepancy
in the analogy between Title VII and Title VIII was Beliveau v.
Caras142:
One commentator has suggested that sexual harassment in the
home is in some respects more oppressive: "WVhen sexual
harassment occurs at work, at that moment or at the end of the
work day, the woman may remove herself from the offensive
environment. She will choose whether to resign from her
position based on economic and personal considerations. In
135. 689 F. Supp. 835 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
136. See id. at 836.
137. 884 F. Supp. 1169 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
138. Id. at 1171 (One plaintiff submitted to the demand for sex "because she was
fearful that she would be forced to leave the Shelter if she did not.").
139. 4 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1993).
140. See id. at 806.
141. Id. The plaintiff filed a criminal complaint against the defendant, who was
consequently convicted of assault in city court. See id.
142. 873 F. Supp. 1393 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
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contrast, when the harassment occurs in a woman's home, it is
a complete invasion in her life. Ideally, home is the haven
from the troubles of the day. When home is not a safe place, a
woman may feel distressed and, often, immobile."' 43
Subsequently, two other residential sexual harassment cases
have reiterated this distinction.'" This support suggests that at
least a few federal courts are willing to hold that sexual
harassment in the home is inherently more egregious than the
same or similar conduct when it occurs in the workplace. 145
Recognition of this fact would lead to holding offenders to a higher
standard of conduct, and would likewise lower the threshold of
what constitutes sufficiently severe or pervasive harassment to
succeed on a hostile environment claim when applied to sexual
harassment in the home.
E. Recent Developments in Sexual Harassment Jurisprudence
Have Failed to Address the Recurring Conflicts in
Residential Sexual Harassment Decisions.
1. The Complex Vicarious Liability Analysis Is Rarely
Applicable In Residential Sexual Harassment Cases.
In 1998, the Supreme Court issued decisions in two separate
sexual harassment cases, 146 stating that its purpose was "to
143. Id. at 1397 n.1 (quoting Cahan, supra note 37, at 1073).
144. See Williams v. Poretsky Management, 955 F. Supp. 490, 498 (1). Md. 1996)
(citing Beliveau, 873 F. Supp. at 1397 n.1.) ("In addition, as the plaintiffs point out,
although courts have looked to employment cases to determine housing claims, the
settings are not completely analogous. At least one court has recognized that
sexual harassment in the home may have more severe effects than harassment in
the workplace."); Reeves v. Carrollsburg Condominium Unit Owners Ass'n, No. 96-
2496 (RMU), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21762, at * 21 (D.D.C. Dec. 18, 1997) (citing
Beliveau, 873 F. Supp. at 1397 n.1) ("It is noteworthy that at least one court has
recognized that sexual harassment in the home may have more severe effects than
harassment in the workplace.").
145. In addition to the few cases expressly citing the Cahan article quoted in
Beliveau, see supra note 144, other courts have recognized the inherent severity of
sexual harassment in the home. See, e.g., Krueger v. Cuomo, 115 F.3d 487 (7th Cir.
1997), stating
It demands little in the way of either empathy or imagination to
appreciate the predicament of a woman who is harassed in full view
of her children, whose home becomes not a sanctuary but the situs
of her torment, and who concludes that she has no alternative but
to leave a long sought-for apartment.
Id. at 492.
146. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998); Burlingon Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
Law and Inequality [Vol. 18:351
address the divergence" 147 among the circuit courts and "to assist
in defining the relevant standards of employer liability."14s The
recent decisions in Ellerth and Faragher dealt primarily with the
issue of employer liability, i.e., whether and when an employer can
be held responsible for the sexually harassing conduct of its
supervisory employees. 149 Transposed to the realm of sexual
harassment in housing, however, such scrutiny of assignment of
liability of the owner to the residence is misplaced. Contrary to
the frequent controversy over whether a supervisor's acts of sexual
harassment may be imputed to the employer, vicarious liability is
rarely disputed in cases of residential sexual harassment. This
fundamental incongruity stems directly from the distinction
between the employment and housing contexts.
First, in contrast to Title VII, the FHA expressly provides for
individual liability by defining "person" to include not only
business entities but also "individuals."'150 Therefore, harassers
147. Faragher, 524 U.S. at 786. The discord among the various jurisdictions is
perhaps epitomized by the opinions of the Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit,
from which the Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the Ellerth case. See
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 749. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court's grant of
summary judgment to Burlington, yet its decision produced eight separate opinions
and no consensus for a controlling rationale. See id.
148. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 751. Despite the Court's intentions, the lower courts
are still in a state of disarray when deciding sexual harassment claims. See, Hegre
& Engelmeier, supra note 77, at 35.
149. See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
150. See 42 U.S.C. § 3602(d) (1999). '"Person' includes one or more individuals,
corporations, partnerships, associations, labor organizations, legal representatives,
mutual companies, joint-stock companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations,
trustees, trustees in cases under title 11, receivers, and fiduciaries." (emphasis
added). Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1999):
It shall be an unlawful employment practice fbr an employer to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his [or her] compensation, terms,
conditions or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. (emphasis added).
Case law has repeatedly held that Title VII does not authorize individual liability,
as its anti-discrimination provisions apply only to employers. See, e.g., Haynes v.
Williams, 88 F.3d 898, 899 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that Title VII does not provide
for individual liability); Williams v. Banning, 72 F.3d 552, 553 (7th Cir. 1995)
(same); Lenhardt v. Basic Inst. of Tech., Inc., 55 F.3d 377, 379-80 (8th Cir. 1995)
(same); Miller v. Maxwell's Int'l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding
that Title VII does not provide for individual liability). Furthermore, the fact that
Title VII applies only to employers with fifteen or more employees evidences a
congressional intent not to subject small entities to liability for discrimination. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000(b). "If Congress decided to protect small entities with limited
resources from liability, it is inconceivable that Congress intended to allow civil
liability to run against individual employees." Miller, 991 F.2d at 587.
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themselves may be found personally liable under the FHA, in
stark contrast with the limitation of Title VII to only vicarious
liability of the employer as principle. 1 1 Additionally, as evidenced
in the majority of residential sexual harassment claims addressed
in federal courts, vicarious liability is infrequently controverted
because the owner/landlord and the harasser are often one and the
same person. 152 There is rarely any attenuation in the chain of
command necessitating an analysis of whether the harasser was
acting within the scope of the authority granted by the landlord
simply because the harasser is in fact usually the sole authority.153
Furthermore, the provision of the FHA that makes it unlawful to
coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with the exercise or
enjoyment of any right protected by the FHA has no parallel in
Title VII, and thus provides a cause of action exclusive to Title
VIII.154 Finally, the duty not to discriminate in housing is non-
delegable, as courts have consistently held. 55 Therefore, while
151. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Matchmaker Real Estate Sales Ctr., 982 F.2d
1086, 1096 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding individual real estate agents, as well as owner
of company, liable for racial steering in violation of Section 3604 of the FHA);
Jeanty v. McKey & Poague, Inc., 496 F.2d 1119, 1120-21 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding
employees of rental management company individually liable for violations of
FHA); United States v. Lorantffy Care Ctr., 999 F. Supp. 1037, 1045 (N.D. Ohio
1998) (stating in dicta that nursing home employees could be held individually
liable for violations FHA); United States v. Sea Winds of Marco, Inc., 893 F. Supp.
1051, 1055 (M.D. Fla. 1995) (stating that condominium employees could be held
individually liable for violations of FHA).
152. See cases cited supra note 35. Of these, only three involved a dispute over
vicarious liability. See Williams v. Poretsky Management, 955 F. Supp. 490, 496-97
(D. Md. 1996); Woods v. Foster, 884 F. Supp. 1169, 1178 (N.D. Ill. 1995); and
Bethisou v. Ridgeland Apartments, No. 88-C5256, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11986, at
*3 (N.D. Ill. Sep. 28, 1989) (mem.). In each of these cases, the owner or
management company was held liable for harassment by its agent.
153. While this fact precludes contentious dispute over vicarious liability, it
likewise constitutes a substantial obstacle for victims of harassment, creating a
self-referential conundrum: when the perpetrator is the sole proprietor of the
property, to whom can the tenant turn for effective recourse without jeopardizing
her safety and stability?
154. See 42 U.S.C. § 3617 (1999); see also supra note 33 and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., Walker v. Crigler, 976 F.2d 900, 904 (4th Cir. 1992) ("Here we
adopt the general rule applied by other federal courts that the duty of a property
owner not to discriminate in the leasing or sale of that property is non-delegable.");
Green v. Century 21, 740 F.2d 460, 465 (6th Cir. 1984) ('[A] principal cannot free
himself of liability by delegating a duty not to discriminate to an agent."); Marr v.
Rife, 503 F.2d 735, 741 (6th Cir. 1974) (quoting favorably United States v. Youritan
Const. Co., 370 F. Supp. 643, 649 (N.D. Cal. 1973)) ("The discriminatory conduct of
an apartment manager or rental agent, is as a general rule, attributable to the
owner and property manager of the apartment complex, both under the doctrine of
respondeat superior and because the duty to obey the law is non-delegable.");
Saunders v. General Servs. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 1042, 1059 (E.D. Va. 1986)
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Ellerth and Faragher, as well as the subsequent amendments to
EEOC policy, may have a substantial impact on sexual
harassment in the employment context, their applicability to the
arena of residential sexual harassment is confined by both the
difference in scope between Title VII and Title VIII and the factual
circumstances of the cases.
2. The Court's Recent Developments Do Not Address The
Most Problematic Element Of Residential Sexual
Harassment: The "Severe Or Pervasive" Requirement.
The usefulness of the discussion of the new employer/owner
liability framework to cases of sexual harassment in housing is
further limited by its own terms: liability becomes relevant only
after the harassment is proven.156 Inasmuch as Ellerth and
Faragher did not directly address other material issues inherent in
sexual harassment litigation, the former standards remain
undisturbed-as do the many conflicts they generate. 157 Of these,
with regard to housing, the most precarious remains determining
what type and degree of harassment satisfies the "severe or
(citations omitted) CUnder the Fair Housing Act, a corporation and its officers 'are
responsible for the acts of a subordinate employee ... even though these acts were
neither directed nor authorized.' ... Courts have followed this rule even where 'it
seems harsh to punish the innocent and well-intentioned employers' because the
statutory duty not to discriminate is non-delegable."). This principle has been
addressed and enforced in the context of residential sexual harassment. See, e.g.,
Williams, 955 F. Supp. at 496-97 ('Indeed, in many circumstances under the Fair
Housing Act, the duty not to discriminate is non-delegable, and an employer may
be held responsible for the discriminatory conduct of his employees, even though
the conduct was not authorized.").
156. See Burlington Indus., Inc., v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 742, 753-54(1988):
When a plaintiff proves that a tangible employment action resulted from
a refusal to submit to a supervisor's sexual demands, he or she
establishes that the employment decision itself constitutes a change in
the terms and conditions of employment that is actionable under Title
VII. For any sexual harassment preceding the employment decision to
be actionable, however, the conduct must be severe or pervasive.
Id.
157. The requirements of both quid pro quo and hostile environment claims have
been the subject of substantial debate, not only in scholarly publications but also in
the courts themselves. See, e.g., Adams, supra note 2, at 42 n.111 (discussing how
courts have struggled in determining what constitutes actionable sexually
harassing conduct). For example, compare Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805
F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986, cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987), holding that repeated
sexual remarks and pin-up posters did not create a hostile environment severe
enough to affect plaintiffs psychological well-being and thus were not actionable,
with Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991), holding that it is the
harasser's conduct that must be severe or pervasive from the perspective of a
reasonable woman, not the alteration in conditions of employment.
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pervasive" requirement to establish an actionable hostile housing
environment. 158 The noticeable absence of consideration of this
requirement in the Ellerth and Faragher decisions leaves
unanswered the critical question plaguing residential sexual
harassment cases: how much harassment must a woman tenant
withstand before her claim is deemed actionable? 159
The residential sexual harassment case that exemplifies the
current failure to appreciate the inherently severe nature of
harassment that occurs in one's home is DiCenso v. Cisneros. o60
Defendant DiCenso went to Plaintiff Brown's apartment to collect
the rent, then began rubbing her arm and back, saying that if she
couldn't pay it, she could take care of it in other ways. 161 When
Brown slammed the door on him, DiCenso stood outside her door
158. The "severe or pervasive" prong of the prima facie hostile environment
claim is of course not the only obstacle faced by victims of environmental sexual
harassment. See generally Oshige, supra note 56 (proposing that the hostile work
environment cause of action be reconfigured as gender-based disparate treatment).
A plaintiff must also prove that the conduct was unwelcome; that it was of a sexual
nature; and that it was not only subjectively severe and pervasive enough to
unreasonably alter her working or housing conditions, but also would have done so
for an allegedly objective reasonable person in her situation. See id. at 566
(emphasis in original). But see Ellison, 824 F.2d at 872 (applying reasonable
woman standard). Furthermore, the very process of bringing a claim against the
harasser subjects plaintiffs to the burden of proving this rigorous prima facie test,
and forces them to "endure degrading and humiliating inquiries about their sexual
histories, as defendants attempt to cast them as unworthy of protection by Title
VII." Oshige, supra note 56, at 566:
Under the perverse structure of current law, a female employee who
brings criminal rape charges against her supervisor is protected from
such inquiries in a criminal trial. But a woman who brings a civil suit
for hostile work environment against her supervisor based on the same
conduct may expect every aspect of her life-from past boyfriends to her
dress to her sense of humor-to be fair game for discovery and
manipulation before a trier of fact.
Id.
159. Compare this inquiry to the rhetorical question posed by the Court in
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998): "How far from the course of
ostensible supervisory behavior would a company officer have to step before his
orders would not reasonably be seen as actively using authority?" Id. at 805.
While the context of the Court's question was a discussion regarding the
problematic distinction between an affirmative misuse of supervisory authority and
a merely an implicit misuse, its own answer raises myriad other, more problematic
issues: "Judgment calls would often be close, the results would often seem
disparate even if not demonstrably contradictory, and the temptation to litigate
would be hard to resist." Id.
160. 96 F.3d 1004, 1008-09 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that the landlord's conduct
was not sufficiently egregious to create an objectively reasonable hostile housing
environment). See also Roos, supra note 114, at 1139-46 (analyzing the DiCenso
case in light of a "sanctity of the home" doctrine).
161. See Dicenso, 96 F.3d at 1006.
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shouting names at her, including "bitch" and "whore."'162 Months
later there was a dispute over the rent and DiCenso served Brown
with an eviction notice. 163 The Seventh Circuit Court reviewed the
issue de novo and concluded that the single instance of
harassment was not sufficient to state a cause of action under a
hostile housing environment theory; consequently, the Court
reversed the decision of the HUD Secretary's designee.164 The
Court stated:
DiCenso's conduct, while clearly unwelcome, was much less
offensive than other incidents which have not violated Title
VII. DiCenso's comment vaguely invited Brown to exchange
sex for rent, and while DiCenso caressed Brown's arm and
back, he did not touch an intimate body part, and did not
threaten Brown with any physical harm. There is no question
that Brown found DiCenso's remarks to be subjectively
unpleasant, but this alone did not create an objectively hostile
environment. 165
The factors referred to by the court, namely the frequency
and severity of the conduct, and whether the harasser touched an
intimate body part, are taken from the Supreme Court's opinion in
Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.166 However, these enumerated
162. See id. Interestingly, the exact language DiCenso used against Brown has
been held to constitute proof of the element of gender animus in claims under the
Violence Against Women Act, 42 USC § 13981. Julie Goldscheid, Proving Gender
Motivation in Civil Rights Remedy Claims Under the Violence Against Women Act,
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 567, 569-72 (Mar.-Apr. 1999) (discussing how sex-based
epithets may serve as proof of gender motivation). See, e.g., Ziegler v. Ziegler, 28 F.
Supp. 2d 601, 606 (E.D. Wash. 1998) (stating that proof of gender-motivation is to
be determined by the totality of the circumstances as it is for race or sex
discrimination, and that Title VII cases provide substantial guidance in assessing
whether the alleged conduct is based on gender). But cf. Hedberg v. Rockford Stop-
N-Go, Inc., No. 97-C50367, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7007, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 27,
1999) (stating that defendant's use of the expletive "bitch" was not inherently
sexual in character).
163. See DiCenso, 96 F.3d at 1006. Brown then filed a HUD complaint for sexual
harassment, which DiCenso claimed was a ploy to avoid paying rent. See id. HUD
investigated the complaint and charged DiCenso with violating the FHA. See id.
An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) concluded that DiCenso's conduct did not rise
to the level of severity require to create a hostile housing environment and
dismissed the complaint. See id. at 1006-07. HUD sought review on Brown's
behalf, and the Secretary's designee affirmed the ALs findings of fact but ruled
instead that the single incident was sufficient to constitute creation of a hostile
environment. See id. at 1007. Brown received an award of damages, and DiCenso
appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court. See id.
164. See id. at 1008-09.
165. Id. at 1008-09.
166. 510 U.S. 17, 21-23 (1993) (emphasis added) (stating that "whether an
environment is hostile or abusive can be determined only by looking at all relevant
circumstances, including the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity;
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factors were not intended to be dispositive, but rather were named
only as suggestions in a non-exhaustive list regarding the
necessity of considering all the circumstances surrounding the
harassment in order to determine whether it is severe or
pervasive. 167 The DiCenso court conceded that the harassment
occurred; however, it nonetheless refused to redress it, a result
that could have been prevented had there been a clear standard
acknowledging the inherent severity of sexual harassment in one's
own home.
While the DiCenso court held that the landlord's extortionate
request "to exchange sex for rent," coupled with his shouting sexist
epithets, was not sufficiently severe so as to be actionable because
it was only one incident, other courts have held otherwise. 168 For
example, the cogent opinion in Beliveau v. Caras emphasized the
role of the context of the home in assessing the severity of the
harassing conduct:
Particularly where, as here, the alleged battery was committed
(1) in plaintiffs own home, where she should feel (and be) less
vulnerable, and (2) by one whose very role was to provide that
safe environment, defendants' contention that plaintiff has
failed to allege conduct that was so severe or pervasive to alter
the conditions of plaintiffs housing environment and has failed
to allege an abusive housing environment resulting from
defendants' conduct is not well-taken. There are few clearer
examples of classic sexual harassment than an unpermitted,
allegedly intentional, sexual touching. Under no
circumstances should a woman have to risk further physical
jeopardy simply to state a claim for relief under Title VILI. 169
The underlying fact situations of DiCenso and Beliveau are
similar in that both involved one primary instance of harassing
conduct that involved physical touching and sexual remarks.
170
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance;
and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance").
167. See id.
168. See, e.g., Beliveau v. Caras, 873 F. Supp. 1393 (C.D. Cal. 1995). However,
the Supreme Court's decision in Ellerth explicitly states, "we express no opinion as
to whether a single unfulfilled threat is sufficient to constitute discrimination in
the terms or conditions of employment." Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S.
742, 754 (1998).
169. Beliveau, 873 F. Supp. at 1398 (internal citations omitted).
170. See id. at 1395. Beliveau did involve some incidents prior to the ultimate
offense. See id. After Plaintiff Beliveau noticed that Defendant Rickell, the
resident manager, was staring at her while she was laying at the apartment pool in
her bathing suit, Rickell began making unwelcome, offensive comments of a sexual
nature to Beliveau. See id. Also during this time, Rickell went to Beliveau's
apartment to repair her shower. See id. While there, he called for Beliveau to
come into the bathroom where he was, put his arm around her, told her he would
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However, the results are blatantly irreconcilable due to the
respective courts' differing application of the relevant standards
and, indubitably, the failure of the DiCenso court to consider the
context of the home in its assessment of the severity of the
harassing conduct in light of the surrounding circumstances,
including the perspective of the victim.171 Because the discrepancy
among the lower federal courts deciding whether harassment is
severe enough to be actionable was not addressed in the opinions
of the recent Supreme Court cases dealing with sexual
harassment, the erratic treatment of residential sexual
harassment cases demonstrated in the foregoing comparison will
continue.172
3. The New Tangible Action Standard Necessitates That
Victims Suffer Either A Loss Of Housing Benefits Or A
Repeated Pattern Of Harassment Before The Conduct
Becomes Actionable.
Perhaps the most problematic aspect of the Supreme Court's
recent decisions as applied in the context of the home is the
Court's replacement of the former quid pro quo category with a
new standard based on whether the victim of harassment suffered
a "tangible employment action."'173 The Court in Ellerth explicitly
stated that the terms quid pro quo and hostile environment are "of
limited utility" and at best, functional in only a descriptive
capacity. 174 Of particular concern to the Court was the use of
like to keep her company any time, and made an explicit comment about her
breasts. See id. When Beliveau pushed him away, he grabbed her breast. See id.
She pushed him away again, then he grabbed her buttock as she left the room. See
id. It is imperative to bear in mind that this assault took place in Beliveau's own
home by a man with a key to her apartment.
171. Cf. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991) (adopting the reasonable
woman standard for analyzing the severity of the harassing conduct).
172. See, for example, Fall v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of Trustees, 12 F. Supp.2d 870
(N.D. Ind. 1998), demonstrating one court's struggle to interpret and apply the
holdings of Ellerth and Faragher while reconciling them with long-standing sexual
harassment doctrine.
173. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760 (describing what may be a tangible employment
action).
174. Id. at 751. The Court further discounted the use of the distinction:
'Quid pro quo' and 'hostile work environment' do not appear in the
statutory text. The terms appeared first in the academic literature...
found their way into decisions of the Courts of Appeals ... ; and were
mentioned in this Court's decision in Meritor (citation omitted).
Nevertheless, as use of the terms grew in the wake of Meritor, they
acquired their own significance .... We do not suggest that the
terms... are irrelevant to Title VII litigation. To the extent they
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these terms to classify unfulfilled threats made by a superior in
conjunction with a sexual demand. 175 Herein lies the confusion of
the Court, and the potentially grave consequence of its
misapprehension.
On its face, a demand for sex under threat of some material
change in employment is precisely a quid pro quo-literally, "this
for that"-in that it coerces the employee to engage in sex or lose
some favorable term of her employment. 176 In the context of
housing, the proffered quid pro quo exchange is sex for rent, under
threat of eviction or other detriment inherent in the power
dynamic between landlord and tenant.177 However, the term quid
pro quo describes only the offer itself, i.e., compliance with a
demand for sex in exchange for continued employment or housing.
In other words, the term quid pro quo harassment defines the
nature of the threat, not the consequence. 78 Therefore, whether
illustrate the distinction between cases involving a threat which is
carried out and offensive conduct in general, the terms are relevant when
there is a threshold question whether a plaintiff can prove discrimination
in violation of Title VII .... When we assume discrimination can be
proved, however, the factors we discuss below, and not the categories
quid pro quo and hostile work environment, will be controlling on the
issue of vicarious liability.
Id. The academic literature that the Court referred to is Catharine MacKinnon's
SExUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN, see supra note 2, the eminent text that
established MacKinnon at the forefront of feminist jurisprudence regarding sexual
harassment, then considered a revolutionary paradigmatic shift. The use of these
terms was a means of describing the experience of harassment from the woman
victim's point of view-i.e., she perceives the environment as hostile. See, e.g.,
Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991) (establishing the reasonable woman
standard). In this way, the terminology allowed harassment to be defined from the
perspective of the women affected by it. See id. The Ellerth Court's abandonment
of the utility of these terms took the power of self-definition away from sexually
harassed women, signifying its continued failure to appreciate harassing conduct
as it impacts women, substituting the presumption that such harassment is
insignificant unless its result is "tangible." This approach completely ignores the
psychic and social costs of sexual harassment and its role in perpetuating the
subordination of women.
175. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 754 (stating- "We must decide, then, whether an
employer has vicarious liability when a supervisor creates a hostile work
environment by making explicit threats to alter a subordinate's terms or conditions
of employment, based on sex, but does not fulfill [them].").
176. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1248 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "quid pro quo").
177. See, e.g., DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1009 (7th Cir. 1996) (stating
explicitly that the landlord "invited Brown to exchange sex for rent.")
178. For a comprehensive explanation of the intended use and purpose of the
terms "quid pro quo" and "hostile environment," see Brief for Respondent Mechelle
Vinson at 9-11, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (No. 84-1979)
(internal citation omitted), which states:
[T]he two recognized forms of sexual harassment are not a hard
distinction. Rather, they are more like poles on a continuum that
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the threat is fulfilled or not, the classification remains accurate as
it refers only to the type of harassment, not the ensuing result.
However, the Court imposed the new tangible action
standard to avoid attaching automatic liability for a quid pro quo
threat where the employee or tenant refused to acquiesce in the
sexual demand.17 9 In effect, this new standard requires that the
threat be somehow fulfilled, that it culminate in a tangible action,
before the employer or landlord is subject to automatic liability for
discrimination.180 The underlying rationale is that the threat
alone is not actionable or worthy of legal sanction, but only the
"direct economic harm."'1' Absent this tangible result, the threat
is relegated to the allegedly less egregious category of hostile
environment, then subject to the rigorous scrutiny of whether it
was sufficiently severe or pervasive.' 82  Requiring that the
harassment rise to some level of frequency or egregiousness
thereby allows harassment below this level to continue unabated
and unchallenged. 8  As applied to housing, the severe or
pervasive requirement establishes a degree of judicial tolerance for
some harassment, in effect qualifying the FHA's promise of "fair
housing... throughout the United States"18 4 to one of housing
with a fair degree of harassment.
The effects of application of the new "tangible action"
standard to residential sexual harassment remain unknown, but
certain suppositions can fairly be made. For example, if the
landlord demands that his tenant have sexual intercourse with
him, the tenant refuses, then later the landlord evicts the tenant,
it is the eviction that renders the harassment actionable, not the
operates on a time line.... Having realized that a rigid distinction
between quid pro quo and environmental harassment is both analytically
incorrect and undermines the purposes of Title VII, one court recently
stated: 'Preventing sex discrimination in employment is too important a
goal to turn upon the vagaries of what does and what does not constitute
a tangible job benefit as distinguished from what is evidently considered
to be an intangible benefit such as psychological well-being at the
workplace.'
179. See supra note 69.
180. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760 (describing what may be a tangible employment
action).
181. See id. at 762.
182. See, e.g., Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 751 (referring to hostile environment sexual
harassment as "bothersome attentions or sexual remarks," effectively trivializing
its severity).
183. See Oshige, supra note 56, at 566-67 C'Because courts require plaintiffs to
establish the severity or pervasiveness of the objectionable conduct, implicitly they
condone a certain level of discriminatory conduct.").
184. 42 USC § 3601 (1999) (stating the FHA's declaration of policy).
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threat itself.15  In effect, the landlord is committing an
extortionate threat of eviction couched in implicit terms due to his
inherent power over the tenant. He is encouraging the tenant to
equate rent money with sexual acts that intimately violate both
her physical integrity and her very dignity, coercing her to choose
between two evils: submitting to an inherently forcible solicitation
of prostitution in order to save her housing, or refusing to do so
and thereby endangering the security of her home and herself.
Such a "choice" is per se severe; it requires no further scrutiny.
Yet this very situation would go unpunished under the tangible
housing action theory, unless the tenant suffers some palpable
economic detriment, or unless she proves that it was severe or
pervasive. 8 6 What is evident from this illustration is the role of
the power dynamic, the intrinsic authority the landlord has over
his tenant, such that it is unnecessary for him to state the obvious
consequence of the tenant's refusal. Indeed, this implied threat
embodied by the offender in his authoritative role was exactly at
issue in Ellerth.8 7 However, the Court found that because
Ellerth's supervisor did not fulfill his threats, her claim should
have been categorized as a hostile environment one, requiring her
to prove the harassment was severe and pervasive. 88
185. Cases in which the victim is coerced into compliance with the superior's
threat are likewise required to meet the severe or pervasive burden, rather than
the automatic liability of the tangible action standard. The rationale is that the
actionable tangible consequence is not coerced sex, but rather the fulfillment of the
threat to terminate the employment or housing. See, e.g., Meritor Savings Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986) (The gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is
that the alleged sexual advances were 'unwelcome.' ... The correct inquiry is
whether respondent by her conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were
unwelcome, not whether her actual participation in sexual intercourse was
voluntary.").
186. "For any sexual harassment preceding the employment decision to be
actionable, however, the conduct must be severe or pervasive." Ellerth, 524 U.S. at
754.
187. Plaintiff Ellerth was subjected to a series of sexist and offensive comments
made by Slowik, her supervisor. See Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 753. On one occasion,
when Ellerth did not respond favorably to his remarks about her breasts, Slowik
told her to "loosen up," and threatened "I could make your life very hard or very
easy at Burlington." Id. at 748. Later Slowik expressed reservation in Ellerth's
promotion interview because she was not "loose enough." Id. On another occasion
Slowik said he did not have time for Ellerth's work-related inquiry "unless you
want to tell me what you're wearing." Id. Yet again, in response to a question by
Ellerth, Slowik asked "[A]re you wearing shorter skirts yet, Kim, because it would
make your job a whole heck of a lot easier." Id.
188. See Eflerth, 524 U.S. at 758 (rejecting the plaintiffs characterization of her
claim as quid pro quo because she suffered no tangible employment action).
Ultimately, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's reversal of summary
judgment against Ellerth, allowing the district court on remand to assess whether
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Furthermore, consideration of what constitutes a "tangible
housing action" makes the inappropriate transposition of
employment standards to housing immediately apparent. 89 The
housing equivalent to termination from employment is eviction.
The consequences are clearly discordant: unemployment is far less
severe than homelessness. 90 Furthermore, the rental housing
market is markedly more competitive than the job market, and
Burlington can successfully prove the available affirmative defense. See id. at 765-
66.
189. See EUerth, 524 U.S. at 762 (describing what may be a tangible employment
action). "A tangible employment action in most cases inflicts direct economic
harm .... Tangible employment actions are the means by which the supervisor
brings the official power of the enterprise to bear on subordinates." Id.
190. While this contention relies on specific yet varying economic forces such as
unemployment and vacancy rates, it is unquestionably true of the current economy.
HUD's website discusses the interplay of the economy and availability of affordable
housing:
Despite 6 years of unprecedented economic growth, millions of families
still struggle to secure decent affordable housing. Ironically, the strong
economy is a key factor pushing rent levels to new record highs. Rather
than benefiting from the surging economy, low-income renters are left to
compete for the dwindling supply of affordable rental housing available
on the private market.
Waiting in Vain: An Update on America's Rental Housing Crisis (last modified June
30, 1999) <http://www.huduser.organizations/affhsg/waiting/execsum.
html>. Issued by HUD as an update documenting the ongoing shortage of
affordable housing, this report identifies three primary findings: (1) time on Section
8 waiting lists for both vouchers and public housing has substantially increased
from 1996 to 1998; (2) the number of families on waiting lists is increasing, now at
a high of one million families; and (3) the lowest income families and seniors have
nowhere else to turn but these HUD subsidies. See id. The findings are due to a
number of named factors, including the fact that rents are outpacing income for
poor Americans; according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, between 1995 and
1997 rents increased faster than income for the 20 percent of families with the
lowest household incomes. See id. Between 1996 and 1998, the Consumer Price
Index for Residential Rent rose 6.2 percent, while the rate of inflation for the same
period was only 3.9 percent. See id. There is a dramatic and consistent loss of
affordable housing (defined as units with rents below $300), a staggering 13
percent drop between just 1996 and 1998 for a loss of almost 950,000 units. See id.
Additionally, as project-based subsidies expire and are due for renewal, the private
owners of these project-based subsidies are continually opting out of their contracts
to convert the units to unsubsidized in order to charge higher rents. See id. The
decline of project-based subsidized housing consequently increases the number of
vouchers issued to residents of properties that opt out. See id. However, the
replacement of project-based housing with vouchers is a trend that exacerbates the
isolation of low-income families in high-poverty neighborhoods, as often the
vouchers do not pay enough to allow residents to stay in their current housing. See
id. They therefore are forced to seek virtually nonexistent affordable housing in
the poorest neighborhoods, a search that often results in homelessness. See id. In
sum, "[a]t a time of unprecedented prosperity for so many, islands of despair
remain. The very strength of our economy is forcing the poorest renters to compete
for a shrinking pool of affordable units." Id.
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thus the likelihood of finding a replacement home is far less than
finding another job. 191 Other tangible housing actions may include
changes in any material term or condition of a victim's tenancy,
such as termination of utilities or failure to make necessary
repairs. Therefore, in order for a tenant to preclude the
availability of the new affirmative defense, she must lose her
home, or at least some material condition of its utility. Surely
such a consequence is far too severe to be in the interests of
justice.
Conclusion
The sexual harassment of female tenants by their landlords
is a flagrant abuse of power, the consequence of which may be
coerced sex, homelessness, or both. While only a handful of
residential sexual harassment cases have been reviewed by the
federal courts, responsive legal examination is critically needed
given the dire circumstances of the victims and the criminal
nature of the underlying conduct. Courts have transposed
standards developed in Title VII employment cases onto
residential sexual harassment cases without considering the
conceptual differences between the two types of harassment,
despite a legal tradition granting the home heightened
protection. 192 The failure of current sexual harassment laws in the
employment context demands that the judicial system consider a
more effective remedy; the developing nature of residential sexual
harassment jurisprudence provides the malleability to welcome
this needed change. Despite the Supreme Court's recent decisions
regarding sexual harassment, federal courts are in a state of
confusion as to what the current law is and how to implement it.
Applying such an inherently flawed paradigm to the particularly
and intimately abusive breed of discrimination in one's home will
inevitably perpetuate many of the same problems, but with even
more grave results suffered by those most vulnerable to them.
It would be an inflammatory injustice to uphold the
191. See id.; see also Adams, supra note 2, at 32-33 (explaining that there is
substantial disparity between supply and demand for affordable housing, and thus
prospective tenants compete intensely for available units).
192. See Adams, supra note 2, at 20. "In the cases that have considered the
issue, courts have simply analogized sexual harassment at home to sexual
harassment in employment, applying the doctrinal analysis developed in that
setting. While the employment paradigm has some usefulness, its application is
limited by the qualitative differences in women's experiences in the two settings."
Id.
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application of ineffective laws and legal standards to
circumstances dealing inherently with people most in need of legal
protection. The overwhelming majority of victims of residential
sexual harassment are women of color struggling to raise their
children in situations of desperate poverty. With no money to
move, and nowhere to go even if the money were available, these
women are literally trapped. When the landlord comes not only to
their doors, but also into their homes-he has his own key, after
all-demanding sex, spewing sexist comments and slurs, and
threatening eviction if the women refuse to submit, it is
unconscionable that our laws require that the women then prove
that such conduct was "severe," or that its consequence was
"tangible." Sexual harassment is discrimination based on sex;
sexual harassment in housing is the economic exploitation of the
most vulnerable cross-section of the population in their most
intimate setting. Thus far our courts have failed to give due
credence to this horrendous invasion of women's rights and homes.
A clearly-articulated doctrine that necessitates consideration of
landlords' overwhelming socioeconomic power over their tenants
and the intrinsically intimate setting of the home is desperately
needed.
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